



Date: November 19, 1979

To: City Manager

From: Chief of Police

Subject: INVESTIGATION OF THE ANTI-KLAN RALLY - NOVEMBER 3, 1979

I have completed an internal investigation of the events and police actions occurring on Saturday, November 3, 1979, during the confrontation between members of the Communist Worker's Party and the Ku Klux Klan during the Anti-Klan Rally.

This report is being forwarded to you for review by yourself and members of the City Council.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation is currently conducting an investigation into the activities of the Ku Klux Klan and the Communist Worker's Party as well as the actions of the Greensboro Police Department relating to the Anti-Klan Rally on November 3, 1979. Copies of police reports, officer's statements, and radio logs have already been submitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

A copy of this report will be submitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for transmittal to the United States Department of Justice.

I am requesting that the Justice Department review and evaluate this report, initiate any further investigation they deem appropriate, and provide a final report to the City of Greensboro.

Violent confrontations, such as the incident on November 3, 1979, pose a serious threat to the safety of the citizens of Greensboro. The events and circumstances of such incidents must be thoroughly reviewed and objectively reported.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads 'William E. Swing'.

William E. Swing
Chief of Police

WES/pd

RESOLUTION REQUESTING THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE TO INVESTIGATE, REVIEW AND REPORT ON ACTIVITIES OF THE KU KLUX KLAN, THE COMMUNIST WORKER'S PARTY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS ARISING OUT OF THE TRAGIC INCIDENTS OCCURRING ON NOVEMBER 3, 1979 IN THE CITY OF GREENSBORO

WHEREAS, an internal investigation has been completed concerning the events and police actions occurring on Saturday, November 3, 1979, during the confrontation between members of the Communist Worker's Party and the Ku Klux Klan during an Anti-Klan Rally;

WHEREAS, the Federal Bureau of Investigation is currently conducting an investigation into the activities of the Ku Klux Klan and the Communist Worker's Party as well as the actions of the Greensboro Police Department relating to the Anti-Klan Rally and copies of police reports, officer's statements and radio logs have already been submitted for review;

WHEREAS, a copy of the report of the internal investigation will be submitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for transmittal to the United States Department of Justice;

WHEREAS, it is deemed in the best interest of the City to request that the U. S. Department of Justice review and evaluate this report, initiate any further investigation deemed appropriate and provide a final report to the City of Greensboro;

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF GREENSBORO:

That the U. S. Department of Justice is hereby requested to review and evaluate the report on the internal investigation concerning the events and police actions occurring on Saturday, November 3, 1979, between members of the Communist Worker's Party and the Ku Klux Klan, initiate any further investigation deemed appropriate, and, further, is hereby requested to provide a final report to the City of Greensboro.

The foregoing resolution was adopted
by the City Council of the City of
Greensboro, N. C. on

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AN ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT OF
THE ANTI-KLAN RALLY,
GREENSBORO, NORTH CAROLINA
NOVEMBER 3, 1979

WILLIAM E. SWING
CHIEF OF POLICE
GREENSBORO POLICE DEPARTMENT

November 19, 1979

PREFACE

This report was compiled from information gathered from
Interviewing Police Employees, Studying Radio Tapes, and
Police Reports.

Report Prepared By:

Captain	
Lieutenant	
Captain	

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BACKGROUND INFORMATION

The Worker's Viewpoint Organization (W.V.O.), which is now known as the Communist Worker's Party (CWP), had been in conflict with the Ku Klux Klan prior to the shooting incident which occurred in Greensboro on November 3, 1979. On July 8, 1979, at 1 p.m., there was a scheduled meeting of the Ku Klux Klan at China Grove, North Carolina, to show a film entitled "Birth of a Nation." The film was to be shown at the Community Center on S. Myrtle Street in China Grove.

Prior to the Klan meeting in China Grove, a poster was circulated urging black and white workers to attend the July 8th meeting, to "take a stand" and "smash the Klan." The back side of the poster advertised a rally and march to "smash the Klan." This march was scheduled to start at 11 a.m. on July 8, 1979, at the Westside Community Center on Harry Street in China Grove, North Carolina. (Appendix A)

On July 8, 1979, a verbal confrontation occurred between members of the Ku Klux Klan and Worker's Viewpoint Organization representatives in China Grove. A confederate flag belonging to Klan members was burned. Although some Klan members were armed, no violence occurred during this confrontation.

Members and supporters of the Worker's Viewpoint Organization were also active in Greensboro prior to the incident on November 3, 1979. On October 4, 1979, television station WGHP, Channel 8, in High Point, North Carolina, announced on its 6 p.m. news program that a "Death to the Klan

March" was to take place and a permit had been requested and issued by the Greensboro Police Department. At this point, no parade permit request had been made to the Greensboro Police Department.

The Channel 8 information regarding the reported "Death to the Klan March" was discussed in a Police Department staff meeting on October 10, 1979. It was felt that if a parade permit was requested, such a permit could not be denied in view of First Amendment Rights. However, restrictions could be placed to help ensure public safety. The restrictions which were discussed included prohibiting weapons, concealed or in view, and restricting sign posts to 2" by 2" thickness.

On October 13, 1979, a supporter of the Worker's Viewpoint Organization was observed distributing "Death to the Klan" posters at the A&T State University Homecoming Game at the War Memorial Stadium. Literature encouraging attendance at the "W.V.O. Anti-Klan Conference" to be held in Greensboro on November 3, 1979, was circulated in Greensboro.

(Appendix B)

On October 16, 1979, a fight occurred at the Cone Mills White Oak Plant on 16th Street. The altercation involved approximately 25 people and resulted in injury to at least one person. This altercation reportedly occurred between members of opposing communist groups. A "Letter from the Worker's Viewpoint Organization" which was obtained on October 18, 1979, identified those who were attacked as "White Oak workers who are close to the Worker's Viewpoint Organization." (Appendix C)

During the afternoon of October 19, 1979, [] came to the Greensboro Police Department to request a parade permit. [] was asked if the permit was for the "Death to the Klan March" advertised by the posters and he replied, "Yes." [] was advised that weapons, concealed or in view, would not be permitted and that sign posts could not be larger than 2" by 2" thickness. [] agreed to abide by the restrictions. A copy of the intended parade route was obtained and [] advised the parade would start at Everitt Street and Carver Drive. [] [] further advised the march would terminate at the All Nation Pentecostal Holiness Church at 1800 Freeman Mill Road. The application for parade permit was completed and notarized and [] was advised it would be mailed to his residence once the permit was approved by the City Manager's Office.

An "open letter to [], [], and all KKK members and sympathizers," dated October 22, 1979, was circulated in Greensboro. This letter challenged the Klan to attend the November 3rd rally in Greensboro. The reverse side of this letter indicated the march would assemble at 11 a.m., November 3, 1979, at the parking lot of Windsor Community Center, 1601 East Lee Street. A copy of this letter was obtained by the Police Department on Thursday, November 1, 1979.

(Appendix D)

General plans for providing police assistance during the proposed march were discussed during a police meeting conducted during the morning of Thursday, November 1, 1979. Items which were discussed included the

parade permit and its contents, groups that might attend the march, and police assignments. Later in the same day, a second planning meeting was held to set a plan of action for the march. Specific assignments were made regarding the deployment of officers along the march route. A decision was made to assign a supervisor to meet with [] at Everitt Street and Carver Drive at 11:30 a.m. on November 3, 1979. The District II Commander had advised [] earlier in the day that the officers who would be assigned to the march would meet with [] at 11:30 a.m. at Everitt Street and Carver Drive on November 3, 1979. Also discussed in the meeting was the importance of having officers in their assigned positions by 11:30 a.m. on the day of the march in accordance with the 12:00 noon starting time shown on the parade permit issued to []

On Thursday, November 1, 1979, [] came to the Police Department and was given the parade permit. (Appendix E) The times, dates, and restrictions on the permit were pointed out to []. [] left the Police Department and conducted a press conference on the Washington Street side of the Municipal Office Building at approximately 10:30 a.m.

During the press conference on November 1, 1979, [] stated, "We fully expect the police to continue their slimy tactics. They will do anything to disrupt the march and disguise themselves. They might harass us or send provocateurs into our ranks to try to disrupt the march, but we want to say clearly at this point to the Police Department and to [] [] stay out of our way. The march will go on."

During that same day, Thursday, November 1, 1979, a man came to the Police Department and requested a copy of the parade permit which had been issued to the Worker's Viewpoint Organization. Upon questioning by officers, the man said he was a member of the Klan and his name was [redacted]. [redacted] had been observed attending the press conference held earlier in the day by [redacted] at the Municipal Office Building. During this press conference, [redacted] had stated that a parade permit had been issued for the march. The officer who was approached by [redacted] had doubts as to whether he should release a copy of the permit. The officer was advised by the City Attorney's Office that the permit was a public document and a copy must be given to [redacted]. [redacted] was given a copy of the parade permit.

A news article which appeared in the Greensboro Record on Friday, November 2, 1979, stated that, "The march, for which the WVO obtained a permit, will occur Saturday, leaving at 11 a.m., from the Windsor Community Center." (Appendix F)

On November 2, 1979, the District II Sergeant, [redacted], was advised by Lieutenant [redacted] that the parade was to leave the area of Everitt Street and Carver Drive at approximately 12:00 noon. Sergeant [redacted] was further advised by Lieutenant [redacted] to meet [redacted] at Everitt Street and Carver Drive at or about 11:30 a.m. for the purpose of discussing the parade and the role the police would play in coordinating the police activity. However, Sergeant [redacted] was further advised that according to printed material placed in circulation by the group during the week of October 29 through November 2, 1979, there would be an Anti-Klan march and

conference to be held on November 3, 1979. The literature further advertised the march would assemble at 11:00 a.m. in the parking lot of Windsor Community Center, located at 1601 East Lee Street. The literature further advised a conference would be held at the All Nation Pentecostal Holiness Church, located at 1800 Freeman Mill Road. The time for the conference was listed at 2:00 p.m. Literature further indicated the march and conference were sponsored by the Worker's Viewpoint Organization. (See Appendix D) Sergeant [] was prepared to check both locations.

EVENTS OF NOVEMBER 3, 1979

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On Saturday morning, November 3, 1979, District II Sergeant [REDACTED], who was assigned to coordinate the march activity, met with each of the four on-coming first shift patrol squads. He advised each of the squads that he would be coordinating activities for the march which was scheduled to form at 11:00 a.m. and begin at 12:00 p.m. The squads were informed that one officer had been assigned to lead the march and another was to follow the march. Sergeant [REDACTED] advised the squads that two (2) Tactical Squads had been assigned to assist with the march. The officers were further advised to have their riot gear available if they were needed for assistance other than traffic control. The process of informing the four squads of the above information occurred between 5:45 a.m. and 7:00 a.m. (See Illustration I for parade route.)

Sergeant [REDACTED] assigned District II Officer [REDACTED] to lead the march and District II Officer [REDACTED] to follow the march. He informed the officers there was conflicting information as to where the march was to form. He advised the officers that posters distributed by the Workers Viewpoint Organization indicated the march would form at Windsor Community Center but the parade permit and the march route indicated the march would begin at Everitt Street and Carver Drive at 12:00 p.m. Sgt. [REDACTED] informed the two officers to be at Everitt Street and Carver Drive at 11:30 a.m.

At approximately 10:00 a.m. on November 3, 1979, a meeting was held at the Police Department to brief the Tactical Officers who were assigned to assist with the march. This meeting was also attended by Lieutenant

PROPOSED PARADE ROUTE AND TACTICAL UNIT LOCATIONS, PRIMARY AND SECONDARY




ILLUSTRATION I

[] Commanding Officer of the Tactical Unit, Sergeants [] and [] (the supervisors of Tactical Squads A and B) and Detective [], who was assigned to function as a surveillance unit. The Police Attorney [] and Lieutenant [] joined the meeting shortly after it began. Lieutenant [] had checked the exterior of the All Nation Pentecostal Holiness Church at 1800 Freeman Mill Road before coming to the meeting. The church was scheduled to be the termination point of the march and the location of the rally which was to be held after the march.

During the above meeting, Detective [] advised Tactical Officers of intelligence information he had received that morning (Nov. 3, 1979). Detective [] advised the officers that the number of Klan members that might be present was unknown; however, some Klan members were already at a residence on Randleman Road. Detective [] further advised the officers that his information was that Klan members planned to ride the parade route and heckle the marchers. Detective [] also told the officers, based upon his information, that if any confrontation occurred, it would probably be at the ending point of the parade, located at Florida and Freeman Mill Road. Detective [] further related his information was some Klan members had handguns. The information provided the officers was considered reliable and up-to-date.

The Police Attorney briefed officers about City Ordinances and State Laws that could be pertinent if enforcement action became necessary. (Appendix G)

Lieutenant [] advised the Tactical Officers that Sergeant [] and the District II Officers would have primary responsibility for the march, and the Tactical Unit would provide back-up and support if needed. Tactical

Squad B was assigned to be at the Dudley High School parking lot no later than 11:30 a.m. and to relocate to the Calvin Wiley School parking lot on Terrell Street when the march reached the halfway point in its route. Tactical Squad A was assigned to be at Gillespie Junior High School no later than 11:30 a.m. and to relocate to Terrell Street and Freeman Mill Road when the march reached the halfway point in its route. (See Illustration I)

Detective [] was assigned to pick up Special Investigator [] from the Police Crime Lab and try to locate suspected Klan vehicles which might move into the area of the march route. Tactical Officer [] was assigned to work with Special Investigator [] from the Police Crime Lab to provide surveillance of the marchers as they proceeded along the march route. Police Attorney [] was designated to remain with Lieutenant [] during the period of the march.

A total of 26 personnel had now been assigned to participate in the march activity. This total included:

District II Executive Officer

District II Sergeant

2 District II Officers

[] Lieutenant []

[] Sergeant []

[] and []

Commanding Officer, Tactical Unit

Tactical Sergeant, Squad A

Tactical Sergeant, Squad B

15 Tactical Officers

Police Attorney [redacted]

Surveillance Unit [redacted] Det. [redacted]

2 Special Investigators, Crime Lab [redacted] and [redacted]

This meeting was concluded at approximately 10:40 a.m. and the Tactical Officers were given permission to get something to eat so long as it did not interfere with their being at the assigned posts by 11:30 a.m. Officers were granted permission to eat as it could not be determined what period of time would be involved in assisting with the march.

After the meeting, the Tactical Unit Sergeants and the Tactical Officers went to restaurants in the Randleman Road area to get some food before proceeding to their assigned posts. Det. [redacted], functioning as a surveillance unit [redacted] picked up Special Investigator [redacted] from the Police Crime Lab and proceeded to the general area of U.S. 220 and I-85.

At approximately 10:15 a.m., Sergeant [redacted] drove into the area of Everitt Street and Carver Drive to determine if any march participants had begun to gather. He remained in the area for approximately 15 minutes; circling through Morningside Homes and going by Everitt Street and Carver Drive on two occasions. After seeing that no one had gathered at Everitt Street and Carver Drive, Sergeant [redacted] drove to Windsor Community Center, arriving there at approximately 10:30 or 10:31 a.m. He drove west on Gorrell Street behind the Windsor Community Center and observed a racially mixed group of approximately 40-50 persons. A black female was using a megaphone and the crowd was chanting, "Death to the pigs, death to the Klan and pigs stay away." Sergeant [redacted] proceeded west on Gorrell Street to Washington Street School and met with Officers [redacted] and [redacted], who were assigned to escort the march.

At approximately 10:36 a.m., after the meeting at Washington Street School, Sergeant [] and Officer [] proceeded to Windsor Community Center to try to locate [] and inform him the police would lead the march to make sure the march was not disrupted. Neither Sergeant [] nor Officer [] knew [] by sight. As these officers pulled into the parking lot to the rear of the building, a group of approximately 40-50 began chanting, "Pigs stay away, death to the pigs and death to the Klan, pigs stay away." The people in the group continued to clap their hands, chant, and taunt the officers when [] and [] parked their police vehicles and approached the group. The officers approached a black female who was using the megaphone in order to determine if [] was in the group. The black female was standing with a group of approximately seven (7) children who were wearing red berets and brown shirts and carrying banners. Officer [] tried to ask the black female about [], but she refused to answer. Officer [] continued to try to locate [] and asked a white male, who replied he didn't have anything to say to "you people." Officer [] then talked to an elderly black female who also refused to answer. The people in the group refused to listen to the officers or to answer any questions and continued to chant for a short while. When the black female with the megaphone stopped talking, Sergeant [] advised her that a parade permit had been issued for the march and officers would be there for protection and to prevent disruption of the march. The group was informed by Sergeant [] that one police car would lead the march and one police car would follow the march. The group was further informed that officers would control traffic at street intersections for the safety of the group. The group began to chant again and several made remarks such as, "The police are going to kill us, why did you kill that one in jail last week." When the group quietened, Sergeant [] tried to explain the officers were

there to protect, not harass. He informed them of the City Ordinance which allows megaphones and amplifiers to be audible for a distance of 150 feet from the speaker. The group chanted, made remarks about police brutality, and turned their backs to the officers. Sergeant [] decided it would be best to have himself and Officer [] leave the parking lot and back out of the area for a while to avoid inciting the crowd further. The group in the parking lot applauded when Sergeant [] and Officer [] left the parking lot. Sergeant [] decided to wait and see if the group intended to form there at Windsor Community Center and then move to Everitt Street and Carver Drive to begin the march. At this time, Sergeant [] and Officer [] drove to Washington Street School, located two blocks west of Windsor Community Center, to meet with Officer [].

At 10:52, Sergeant [] advised the Communications Center that [] and [] would be "out on special assignment at Windsor Center." At this time, Sergeant [] and Officer [] were at Washington Street School and were advising the Communications Center they would not be available for calls not related to the march. At 11:00, [] advised [] (Lieutenant [] by radio of the attempt made earlier by [] and [] to contact [] at Windsor Community Center. He further advised [] Lt. [] that [] had not been located. The conversation ended with Lt. [] advising Sgt. [] to check back later and try to contact []. At 11:04, [] advised the Communications Center he was assigned to a "special assignment at Windsor Center." [] then went to Washington Street School to meet briefly with [] and [].

* (Transcript of Frequency 1 (one) radio traffic is included in Appendix H.)

(Transcript of Frequency 3 (three) radio traffic is included in Appendix I.)

At approximately 11:05 to 11:06 a.m., [] and [] returned to Windsor Community Center. They again met with chants and hostile remarks from the group gathered in the parking lot. [] decided it would be best for himself and [] to park on Gorrell Street at DeWitt Street, adjacent to the parking lot, waiting to see if [] arrived. (See Illustration II) While [] and [] were parked on Gorrell Street, the group in the Windsor Community Center parking lot continued to grow in size and [] felt that all the march participants were possibly gathering at Windsor before going to Everitt Street and Carver Drive. [] [] planned to go to the Everitt Street and Carver Drive area at 11:30 a.m. if [] did not arrive at Windsor Community Center prior to that time.

At 11:05 a.m., [] asked if the Communications Center had contact with []. The radio operator advised "negative" after trying to contact [] by radio. [] then asked for [] and was advised by [] that [] was still in the office. At 11:06, [] advised [] that eight vehicles had been located sitting on the ramp at 85 and 220. There were approximately 30-35 people sitting in the vehicles. All the vehicles were stationary at the time and [] was observing them. Special Investigator [] who was in the police vehicle with [] photographed the caravan of vehicles and did not see any weapons. (See Illustration III for Klan Caravan Route.)

At 11:12 a.m., [] advised [] the group at Windsor Community Center was hostile and refusing to talk to the police. At 11:13 a.m., [] [] advised [] the caravan was rolling and there was a total of nine (9) vehicles. [] then advised [] of [] radio message of 11:12. [] said, "We're gonna have to wait and see. They're definitely headed in that direction."

WINDSOR COMMUNITY
CENTER

PARKING LOT

LOCATION OF
POLICE UNITS
AFTER RETURN
FROM
WASHINGTON
STREET SCHOOL

NORTH

SCENE OF
SHOOTING

ILLUSTRATION II

ROUTE OF K.K.K. CARAVAN FROM LOCATION WHERE FIRST OBSERVED TO EVERITT AND CARVER




ILLUSTRATION III

At approximately 11:14 a.m., [] and Police Attorney [] were preparing to leave the police parking area to go to the area of the march. At 11:14 a.m., [] was advised to call Communications Center. [] went back into the Police Department and called the Communications Center and was transferred to Sgt. [] in the Staff Duty Office. [] was advised that [] All Nation Pentecostal Holiness Church, 1800 Freeman Mill Road, had telephoned and advised that the Worker's Viewpoint Organization had not been given permission to use the Church and the Church Board had voted against allowing the group to come to the church. [] was further advised that [] was en route to the church and [] decided to meet [] to confirm if the information was correct. [] and the Police Attorney then left the Police Department with the intention of notifying [] of the phone message before going to meet [] [] stated he was delayed some three (3) to five (5) minutes from going into the parade area by the telephone conversation with Sergeant []

At 11:15, [] advised [] of [] message regarding the nine (9) vehicle caravan and of [] message regarding the group at Windsor Community Center. [] asked [] if the vehicles were headed in the direction of the starting point of the march and [] replied in the affirmative. [] instructed [] [] to be prepared to "shift over that way."

At 11:16, [] advised [] "on 29 now, approaching Florida Street." [] asked [] if he (and his squad) were in position and [] replied they were not because most had stopped to get a sandwich. [] advised [] to rush it up, there were about 14 minutes left.

At 11:17, [] advised [] "just made the turn off onto Lee Street." [] then tried to contact [] but was unable to do so. At 11:18.57, [] advised, "turning on Willow Road now." At 11:19.22, [] advised [] and [] to hustle and get into position because "they're moving before we anticipated." At 11:20.14, [] advised [] "part of them should be there by now." At 11:20.52, [] advised [] "they're parking up on Everitt Street at Willow Road." (See Illustration IV)

At 11:21.20, [] asked [] if he [] had copied [] [] message and [] replied he had not. [] further advised he had been on the phone and needed to pass new information on to [] [] The information that [] wanted to relay to [] was in regard to the telephone call from [] The news that [] did not want the marchers to [] was very significant because of the intelligence information received by [] earlier in the day that if trouble developed, it would likely be at the termination point of the march [] A new location at which to hold the planned rally at the end of the march would now have to be located. [] requested a meeting with [] at the old train station. At 11:22.02, [] advised [] "they're now at the formation point." [] then asked [] to clarify his last message.

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At 11:22.25, [] advised that 9 or 10 cars had arrived at the formation point and heckling appeared to be occurring. [] advised further that some of the parade members were scattering. At 11:23.10, [] advised, "we've got a 10-10 (fight) down here, you better get some units in here."

APPROACH ROUTE OF K.K.K. CARAVAN TO EVERITT AND CARVER INCLUDING
LOCATION OF SURVILLANCE VEHICLE AT 11:23.28, 3 November, 1979


ILLUSTRATION IV

NORTH

ROUTE OF
CARAVAN

SCENE OF
SHOOTING

SURVILLANCE VEHICLE



At 11:23.16, [] asked [] if his people were in position.

[] was referring to the officers at Dudley High School). []

then called [] [] advised he was en route from 85 and 220. At 11:23.38, [] advised, "shots fired, sounds like..."

At 11:23.31, [] advised to move the cars into the area. []

advised [] - assigned to Gillespie Junior High School) to "move in."

At 11:23.40, the Frequency 3 operator requested where the cars that were on Frequency 1 (patrol cars on routine patrol) were to be sent.

[] advised, "move them into the area..., should be there at Windsor Community Center." At 11:23.47, [] advised "heavy gunfire." At

11:23.50, the Frequency 1 operator advised, "[] [] and

[], Everitt and Carver, move into the area, have a 10-10 (fight), possible shots fired, just move into the area and stand by." These three units were assigned to normal call-answering duties on November 3rd, and were being sent to Everitt Street and Carver Drive to assist.

At 11:23.51, [] advised to, "pull all available units in the city to the area of..., the Windsor Community Center. Don't all come to the area, I'll advise further when I arrive on the scene." [] was en route to Everitt Street and Carver Drive at the time, but did not want all the police units in the city to rush into the area of Everitt and Carver. So, he directed the cars to head towards Windsor Community Center until he could arrive at Everitt Street and Carver Drive to advise further on the situation. At 11:24.02, [] Captain

[] advised, "just use the Tact units,...the ones on F-3,...both Tactical Squads." At 11:24.14, [] advised, "It's not at Windsor, I think they're at Everitt and Carver where... the Tact units are at. We're with the group at Windsor, no problem." At 11:24.29, [] advised, "most

of the fire is coming from the yellow van, they're now leaving the scene..." (the remainder of the message is not understandable because of telephone conversation occurring simultaneously.)

It should be noted that Captain [] is the Commanding Officer of the District II, where the march was scheduled to begin. Captain [] had placed [] in charge of the march activities for November 3, 1979. On November 3, 1979, Captain [] was scheduled to attend a 12:00 p.m. meeting at the Cosmos Restaurant, located on East Market Street. However, Captain [] left his residence early for the purpose of checking with [] about the march and checking the area of the scheduled parade and was near the area when [] reported shots fired.

During the period of time from 11:24.42 to 11:25.10, several telephone calls were received from callers in the Everett Street and Carver Drive area to report the shooting incident. The tape transcript of that period of time is dominated by those telephone conversations and very little of the communication from the cars responding to the scene or cars at the scene can be heard.

At 11:25 a.m., Sergeant [] the Staff Duty Officer, notified the Communications Center by telephone that Captain [], Acting Field Operations Bureau Commander, had been notified of the incident and would be en route.

At 11:25.19, [] advised, "send ambulances at Carver and Everitt."
[] then asked for several (ambulances). At 11:25.27, [] []
and [] advised, "we got the van on Everitt, get some help." At 11:25.32,
[] [] and [] advised arrival in the area (Everitt Street and
Carver Drive). At 11:25.37, [] advised he had arrived at the
scene. At 11:25.53, [] requested several ambulances. At 11:25.57,
the Frequency-3 Operator telephoned the Guilford County Ambulance Service and
requested an ambulance at Everitt Street and Carver Drive. At 11:25.58,
[] advised there were automatic weapons in the van. At 11:26.26,
[] advised "Signal 50" [] message indicated the officers
who had apprehended the van had that situation under control). (See
Illustration V) At 11:26.44, [] advised he had arrived in the
area.

At 11:26.46, the Frequency-3 Operator advised an ambulance was en route to
Everitt Street and Carver Drive. At 11:27.02, [] advised, "informa-
tion, 5 wounded, 5 wounded." At 11:27.07, [] called []
and inquired, "You want to try to stop some of those other cars that were
leaving, the other members"? [] did not hear this message because
he was outside his vehicle assisting with the arrest of the suspects in the
van.

At 11:27.19, [] advised the Frequency-1 Operator to "have all
units on F-1 switch to F-3 and seal off the Carver and Everitt Street area,
wide perimeter". The Frequency-1 Operator broadcast [] message at
11:27.28.

LOCATION OF TAC "B", ROUTE OF TAC "B", AND
LOCATION K.K.K. VAN WAS STOPPED IN RELATION
TO THE SHOOTING SCENE

- ④ LOCATION OF TAC "B"
- ② LOCATION IN WHICH K.K.K. VAN WAS STOPPED BY TAC "B"
- ③ SHOOTING SCENE



ILLUSTRATION V

At 11:28.00, [] inquired how many ambulances were en route to the Everitt and Carver area. The Frequency 1 Operator replied that one (1) ambulance was en route; however, Guilford County Ambulance Service records indicate four (4) ambulances had been dispatched by 11:27 a.m. The records also indicate the first two (2) ambulances arrived at 11:29 a.m., the third arrived at approximately 11:35, and the fourth ambulance (a suburban wagon) arrived at approximately 11:45.

At 11:29.53, [] advised, "we're gonna have a possible homicide; give us all the assistance you can get at Dunbar and Everitt to keep this crowd back." The Frequency 3 Supervisor advised all available units to move into the area of Dunbar and Everitt to assist in crowd control. At 11:30.54, [] advised he needed the paddy wagon at Everitt Street and Carver Drive. At 11:32.50, [] advised that at least seven (7) persons had been shot.

At 11:33.17, [] requested for Internal Affairs Division and the Commanding Officer of the Field Services Division to be notified of the incident. At 11:34.03, [] advises there will possibly be three (3) deceased from the incident.

[] was assigned to conduct the preliminary investigation of the incident and the investigative process was started.

SUMMARY

In summary, a parade permit was obtained by [] on behalf of the Worker's Viewpoint Organization for a march and rally to be held on November 3, 1979. [] in providing information for the parade permit, indicated the starting point for the march would be at Everitt and Carver Drive with a starting time of 12:00 p.m. However, the Police Department received information in the form of literature bearing the name of the Worker's Viewpoint Organization indicating the march would assemble in the parking lot of Windsor Community Center at 11:00 a.m. on November 3, 1979. The literature further indicated a conference would be held at 2:00 p.m. in the All Nation Pentecostal Holiness Church located at 1800 Freeman Mill Road, and the march would terminate at this same location.

On November 1, 1979, [] came to the Police Department to pick up a copy of the parade permit and during a chance meeting with Captain [] [] was advised that the officers who would be assigned to the march would meet with him [] at or about 11:30 a.m. on November 3, 1979, at Everitt Street and Carver Drive. The purpose of this meeting would be to coordinate the march activities. It was Captain [] opinion that [] agreed to this meeting.

On November 3, 1979, Sergeant [] advised all oncoming patrol squads of the scheduled march and the proposed route of the march. Sergeant [] started checking the Morningside Homes area around 10:10 a.m. and specifically checked Everitt Street and Carver Drive, attempting to locate persons

connected with the march. At or about 10:30 a.m., after locating no march participants in the Everitt Street and Carver Drive area, Sergeant [] drove by the rear of Windsor Community Center. He observed a group of 40 to 50 people gathered in the parking lot at the rear of Windsor Community Center. At the time of the observations, the group was chanting and a black female holding a megaphone appeared to be leading the chanting. Sergeant [] then called for a meeting with the two patrol officers he had previously assigned to escort the march. While Sergeant [] was making his observations at Windsor Community Center, a briefing was being conducted from members of the Tactical Support Unit. The briefing session started at 10:00 a.m. and the following individuals were in attendance:

Lieutenant []

Lieutenant []

[] (Police Attorney)

Detective []

Sergeant []

Sergeant []

Officers assigned to Squads A and B of the Tactical Support Unit

Detective [] advised the officers that according to intelligence information received that morning, an undetermined number of Klan members would be coming to Greensboro. Detective [] further advised some Klan members were already meeting at an individual's residence on Randleman Road. The officers were further advised by [] that some Klan members had handguns. Detective [] indicated that based upon information received, the Klan members plan to follow the parade route and heckle the marchers. The officers were told by Detective [] that if any confrontation happened, it would probably occur at the end of the parade around Freeman Mill Road and Florida Street.

Police Attorney [] briefly discussed State Laws and City Ordinances that might be appropriate should enforcement action become necessary. Lieutenant [] then made assignment to Tactical Squads A and B. Both squads were instructed to be on their post by 11:30 a.m. The Tact officers were granted permission to get something to eat as it was uncertain how long they would be involved with the march assignment. This permission was conditional in that it did not interfere with their being on assignments at 11:30 a.m.

After a brief meeting with the patrol officers assigned to the march, Sergeant [] and Officer [] went to Windsor Community Center to locate []. In attempting to locate [] Sergeant [] and Officer [] sought the assistance of several people, but the officers were treated with hostility. In spite of the hostile attitude displayed, Sergeant [] informed members of the group of the role of the police in escorting the march. Then, Sergeant [] and Officer [] withdrew from the parking lot. Sergeant [] and Officer [] returned to Washington Street School, some two blocks west of Windsor Community Center, where Sergeant [] by radio, notified Lieutenant [] of their unsuccessful attempt to contact [] and of the hostile attitude displayed by the group at Windsor Community Center. Lieutenant [] indicated that Sergeant [] should make further attempts to contact []. At or about 11:06 a.m., Sergeant [] and Officer [] returned to the rear area of Windsor Community Center to again try to contact [].

Detective [] at or about 11:06 a.m., observed eight vehicles parked on the ramp of I-85 and 220. Detective [] recognized some of these vehicles

as belonging to suspected Klansmen. Detective [] attempted to report his observations to Lieutenant [] and Lieutenant []. However, neither officer was in service. Detective [] then notified [] Sergeant [] that eight vehicles containing 30 or 35 people were parked on the ramp of I-85 and 220. Detective [] further advised the vehicles were stationary; however, he would continue to monitor.

At or about 11:11.06, Detective [] advised Sergeant [] of the same information given earlier to Sergeant [].

Detective [] advised Sergeant [] at 11:13.51, that the vehicles were now rolling, heading in that direction from this location. Detective [] further advised there was now a total of nine vehicles. Sergeant [] acknowledged Detective [] radio transmission and further related to Detective [] that Sergeant [] had earlier advised the group was hostile and belligerent. Detective [] acknowledged Sergeant [] transmission and further advised they were definitely headed in that direction.

At or about 11:15, Lieutenant [] and Police Attorney [] were preparing to leave the Police Underground and drive into the area of the parade; however, Lieutenant [] was advised to call the Communications Center. Lieutenant [] returned inside the Police Department and after calling the Communications Center, was referred to Sergeant []. Sergeant [] related that he had had a telephone conversation with an individual identifying himself as []. Sergeant [] stated [] advised permission had not been given for the marchers to use the All Nations Pentecostal Holiness Church, located at 1800 Freeman Mill Road.

At 11:15.46, Sergeant [] related to Lieutenant [] Detective [] information pertaining to the nine vehicles moving from I-85 and 220. Sergeant [] further advised Lieutenant [] that Sergeant [] group was boisterous and belligerent. Lieutenant [] asked if the cars were headed in the direction of the starting point, and Sergeant [] responded that was [] information.

At 11:16.20, Detective [] advised Lieutenant [] the vehicles were on 29, approaching Florida Street. Lieutenant [] then advised Sergeant [] to rush it up, they had fourteen more minutes according to his watch.

At 11:17.45, Detective [] advised Lieutenant [] "just made turn off onto Lee Street." At 11:18.57, Detective [] advised Lieutenant [] "turning on Willow Road now."

Lieutenant [] at or about 11:19, advised Sergeant [] and Sergeant [] to hustle and get in their positions because they were moving before anticipated. Detective [] at 11:20.14, advised Lieutenant [] "part of them should be there by now almost."

Lieutenant [] then asked Communications to try and contact Lieutenant []

Detective [] at 11:20.52, advised Lieutenant [] "they're parking up on Everitt Street at Willow Road."

Lieutenant [] then radioed Lieutenant [] asking if Lieutenant [] had received Detective [] transmission. Lieutenant [] advised he had not, as he had been on the telephone. Lieutenant [] further advised Lieutenant [] a meeting was necessary as new information had just come to light, which Lieutenant [] needed to know.

Lieutenant [] asked [] location and after being advised Washington and Benbow, Lieutenant [] selected the old train station for the meeting place.

At 11:22.02, Detective [] advised Lieutenant [] "they're now at the formation point." Lieutenant [] then asked Detective [] to clarify his last message. Detective [] at 11:22.25, advised nine or ten cars on the opposite side had arrived at the formation point for the parade. Detective [] further advised, "it appears as though they're heckling at this time, driving on by, they're definitely creating attention and some of the parade members are, (breaking transmission).. they're scattering, stand by, one."

At 11:23.13, Detective [] advised there was a fight and further advised additional units needed at the scene.

Lieutenant [] asked Lieutenant [] if his people were in position. Lieutenant [] then radioed Sergeant [] who replied en route from I-85 and 220.

At 11:23.28, Detective [] advised, "Shots fired, (it) sounds like..."

At 11:23.31, Lieutenant [] notified Communications to move the cars into the area. At 11:23.37, Lieutenant [] advised Sergeant [] to move in.

At 11:23.47, Detective [] advised, "Heavy gunfire."

Officers [] and [] assigned to the Tactical Support Unit, Squad B, arrived on their assignment at Dudley High School at or about 11:20 a.m. Officers [] and League were monitoring Detective []

radio transmission. Upon hearing Detective [] advise a fight was in progress, the officers immediately started toward Everitt and Carver Drive. Officers [] and [] were traveling north on Lincoln Street near Lee when they heard Detective [] advise shots fired. The officers increased their speed and estimated they arrived on Everitt in approximately 35 seconds from Lincoln and Lee. Additionally without waiting to be dispatched, upon hearing Detective [] advise fight in progress, Officers [] and [] located at Gillespie School; and Officers [] and [] located at Benbow and Asheboro, immediately proceeded toward Everitt and Carver Drive.

During this period, the Communications Center was directing vehicles into the Everitt and Carver Drive area. The officers being dispatched had not been assigned to the parade route and were being assigned by the Frequency 1 operator.

Officers [] and [] received Detective [] information that most of the fire (gunfire) was coming from the yellow van. Officer [] and Officer [] observed the van on Everitt and were successful in stopping the movement of the van. Officer [] and Officer [] with assistance provided by other officers, arrested the 12 occupants of the van.

In review, one minute after Detective [] notification of shots fired (11:23.28), there were nine police units and eleven police officers on the scene, in the Everitt and Carver Drive area. Additionally, within two minutes of Detective [] notification, there were 13 police units and 17 police officers on the scene in the Everitt and Carver Drive area. This information was gathered primarily through personal interviews with the officers who were involved although information recorded on the tapes of the police radio messages was used whenever available. (See Appendix L, shows the location of these police units at the time when the shots were reported at 11:23.28 and identifies the officers.)

The area was sealed off and a crime scene area was established. Officer

b6
b7c

[redacted] was assigned the preliminary investigation of the incident.

The names of those individuals killed and/or wounded are provided in a separate list. (Appendix J)

In addition to the 12 men in the van arrested at the scene, three more individuals were arrested on November 3, 1979, for a total of 15, 3 of which were C.W.P. members. (Appendix K)

On November 4, 1979, two additional individuals were arrested and on November 14, 1979, one additional suspect was arrested. As of this report, there have been a total of 18 individuals charged in this investigation.

After careful review, it appears certain factors which either inadvertently occurred or were deliberately created caused a conflict of information regarding the starting time and place of the march. The parade permit which was issued indicated the march would start from Everitt and Carver Drive at 12:00 noon. However, literature advertising the march indicated those interested should assemble at the Windsor Community Center parking lot at 11:00 a.m. An article appearing in the Greensboro Record, dated November 2, 1979, indicated the march would occur Saturday, leaving at 11:00 a.m. from the Windsor Community Center. In this same article, [redacted] was listed as a [redacted] for the Worker's Viewpoint Organization. [redacted] warned that the police and [redacted] should, "Stay out of our way."

Due to the conflicting information, Sergeant [redacted] was prepared to check both locations on November 3, 1979. In the period between 10:10 a.m. and 10:30 a.m., Sergeant [redacted] checked the Everitt Street and Carver Drive area and found no indications that a march was forming. Sergeant [redacted] then checked

the parking lot of the Windsor Community Center shortly after 10:30 a.m. and observed 40 to 50 people on the lot. When Sergeant [] and Officer [] [] approached the crowd in an attempt to locate [] they were met with a belligerent and hostile attitude. Because of the attitude displayed by the group, Sergeant [] and Officer [] left the Windsor Center parking lot without learning any information of the whereabouts of [] and/or the plans of the participants in the march. After a brief conversation with Lieutenant [] and a meeting with Officer [] and Officer [] Sergeant [] and Officer [] returned to Windsor Community Center, parking on Gorrell Street adjacent to DeWitt Street, where they could observe the crowd. At this time, both Sergeant [] and Officer [] assumed all the marchers were at the Windsor Community Center location and would probably soon be going to Everitt and Carver Drive. It would certainly appear this belief on the part of the officers was created by the earlier conflict of information pertaining to the starting point of the march and the attitude of the crowd toward the officers.

Additional information revealed in an article by [] [] on November 7, 1979, indicated that some members of the press who had gone to Windsor Community Center on November 3, 1979, were told the site of the rally had been changed to Everitt Street and Carver Drive and were asked not to tell the police about the change. Several media people interviewed for the article said they were advised of the change or given explicit directions how to get to Everitt Street and Carver Drive. The article stated that [] [] who was contacted on Tuesday night, said he did tell Channel 8 the march is moving to Everitt Street and explained that he had announced the march for 11:00 a.m. Saturday to create a "certain amount of diversion from people who would want to ride by and attack our leadership." (Appendix L)

Another factor to be considered concerns Lieutenant [] being asked to return inside the Police Department to call Communications and ultimately being referred to Sergeant []. As previously discussed, the information given to Lieutenant [] by Sergeant [] was indeed important; however, during the period of the telephone conversation, Lieutenant [] was not able to monitor the radio traffic and was not aware of the rapidly occurring movements of the suspected Klan members being reported by Detective []. When Lieutenant [] returned to his vehicle, he immediately arranged a meeting with Lieutenant [] for the purpose of informing Lieutenant [] of the information just received. However, due to the circumstances occurring, the meeting never took place. It would further appear from the information gathered that Lieutenant [] quickly gained sufficient information to determine the problems were occurring at Everitt and Carver Drive and therefore, Lieutenant [] had no delay in his response time to the incident. Although at 11:23.43, Lieutenant [] in advising Communications to move cars into the area, indicated, "should be there at Windsor Community Center." At 11:23.51, Lieutenant [] further advised Communications Center to pull all available cars in the city to the area of the Windsor Community Center. Lieutenant [] further advised, "Don't all come to the area, I'll advise further when I arrive on the scene." Lieutenant [] indicated he was fully aware the problem was at Everitt and Carver Drive, but he directed the police units to Windsor Community Center area as he did not want a large number of vehicles to respond to Everitt and Carver Drive unless they were needed. Although Lieutenant [] initially appeared to be somewhat confused as to the location of the incident, the Tactical officers responding knew the proper location, Everitt and Carver, from monitoring Detective [] radio transmissions. The officers not involved in the march activities were dispatched to the proper location by the Frequency 1 operator. Therefore, there does not appear that any delay was created in any officer's response time due to Lieutenant [] radio transmissions.

After Lieutenant [] checked into service, he was given an informational update from Sergeant [] reference Detective [] radio transmissions. Lieutenant [] then began to monitor Detective [] radio transmissions describing the movement of suspected Klan vehicles. Lieutenant [] advised he was leaving the Police Department as Lieutenant [] was departing, however, Lieutenant [] was asked to call the Staff Duty Officer and returned inside the Police Department. The police attorney was with Lieutenant [] at this time. Lieutenant [] drove to Gorrell Street from the Police Department and went east on Gorrell Street to Benbow Road. At this intersection Lieutenant [] observed 25 to 35 people on the parking lot to the rear of Windsor Community Center. Lieutenant [] further believes the people were carrying some types of banners. Lieutenant [] only briefly looked at the group.

Lieutenant [] turned on Benbow Road headed north, en route to check Everitt Street and Carver Drive. However, Lieutenant [] felt, after seeing the crowd at Windsor Community Center, that most of the activity would occur at that location (Windsor Community Center parking lot).

At Benbow and Washington Street, Lieutenant [] turned east on McConnell Road and met Detective [] Lieutenant [] was advised by Detective [] that he wished to discuss a matter, and both officers pulled into a traffic safety zone located at Washington Street and McConnell Road. Lieutenant [] asked Detective [] if he was working with Detective [] and he was informed that Detective [] was not working with Detective [] on this occasion. Detective [] wanted to discuss an incident unrelated to the ongoing events.

Lieutenant [] then called for a meeting with Lieutenant [] to advise new information. After giving his location as Washington Street and Benbow Road, Lieutenant [] was requested to meet at the old train station.

The conversation with Detective [] was concluded and Lieutenant [] turned west on McConnell Road at Benbow Road. Lieutenant [] then heard Detective [] radio transmission of heckling and a possible disturbance.

Lieutenant [] turned south on Benbow toward Windsor Center. Lieutenant [] advised, after having seen the crowd at Windsor Center, he believed the incident was taking place in the rear parking lot of Windsor Community Center. While en route to Windsor Community Center (a distance of 3 blocks), Sergeant [] advised there was no problem at Windsor Community Center.

Lieutenant [] pulled across a city right-of-way at the northeast corner of the intersection of Gorrell and Benbow. Lieutenant [] never stopped as he was advised there was no problem and he could now see there was no problem. Lieutenant [] drove east on Gorrell Street to O'Henry Boulevard, north on O'Henry Boulevard to McConnell Road, and East on McConnell Road to Gillespie Street to Everitt Street. During this period, Lieutenant [] advised he monitored a radio transmission from Detective [] which consisted of an alert for a yellow van on Everitt Street. Lieutenant [] while on McConnell Road, heard Officer [] advise, "We got the van on Everitt Street."

When Lieutenant [] arrived on Everitt Street, the yellow van was coming to a stop. Lieutenant [] got out to assist and was quickly joined by

other officers, including Lieutenant [] Officer [] and Sergeant []

[]
Lieutenant [] advised he first rode by Windsor Community Center after hearing Detective [] radio transmission reference a fight because he had just seen 25 or 30 people in the parking lot and felt this was the area where the march was being formed. Additionally, two police units from District II were parked on Gorrell Street observing the crowd.

Lieutenant [] immediately proceeded to Everitt and Carver Drive after determining the problem was not at Windsor Community Center. Lieutenant [] was the second police unit to arrive on the scene and estimated his response time as being 40 seconds after hearing Detective [] advise, "Shots fired."

Lieutenant [] further stated he was not confused by Lieutenant [] radio transmission, but he rode by Windsor Community Center due to his own observations.

Lieutenant [] response time was not significantly delayed and he was the second response unit to arrive. Additionally, Lieutenant [] was not apparently too confused as he was the third response unit to arrive at the Everitt and Carver area.

As previously mentioned, Sergeant [] and Officer [] assumed all the marchers were located at Windsor Community Center. Upon hearing Detective [] radio transmission of a fight at Everitt Street and Carver Drive,

Sergeant [] and Officer [] remained at their location to provide protection for the group gathered in the Windsor Community Center parking lot, as the officers believed the Klan might drive to their location. The officers also believed that the Tactical units were going to handle the situation at Everitt and Carver Drive. Officers of the Tactical Unit were, in fact, en route, and two Tactical units containing three officers were the first to arrive in the Everitt and Carver Drive area. Sergeant [] and Officer [] immediately proceeded to Everitt and Carver Drive upon hearing Detective [] advise, "Shots fired," and arrived within forty (40) seconds after Detective [] transmission.

CONCLUSIONS


After a comprehensive review and analysis of available data, it is concluded that:

1. The planning and preparation for the Anti-Klan march and rally were adequate and proper. The Klan was considered a threat and additional personnel were assigned.
2. The level of personnel assigned specifically to the march was sufficient and based on the scheduled march at 12:00 p.m., the assignment times were appropriate.
3. Confusion was created by having groups at two locations simultaneously. The officers assigned escort duty were in position and observing the group at Windsor Community Center. They reasonably believed that group to be the march participants and were not aware of the group at Carver Drive and Everitt Street.
4. Confusion was further created by the early movement of the Klan Caravan. Police were hampered by not being in assigned positions at the time of the Worker's Viewpoint Organization-Klan confrontation which took place forty (40) minutes prior to the scheduled march.
5. Based on the information known to police, the low-visibility position taken to avoid promoting confrontation between marchers and police was justified.

6. The presence, movement, and location of the Klan caravan was reported to officers assigned to the march by a surveillance unit. There was insufficient probable cause to stop and/or arrest the members of the caravan.
7. While there were radio transmissions incorrectly indicating Windsor Community Center as the location where the shooting was occurring, subsequent transmissions gave the actual location. Police units responding to the scene at Everitt Street and Carver Drive were not delayed by the incorrect radio transmissions.
8. Response time to the scene was not unreasonable after officers were notified of the confrontation. Even though the confrontation began approximately eight (8) minutes before the officers were to be on their assignments, the responding officers made successful and quick apprehensions of suspects. The officers quickly secured the crime scene and summoned and rendered medical aid.
9. The surveillance officer acted properly by observing the scene and maintaining continuous communication after he made first notification that shots had been fired.
10. It is concluded that the police officers assigned to the march performed their duty in a professional and reasonable manner and there is no evidence to indicate that any officer hindered or interfered with the march.

APPENDICE

What made a difference in China Grove was the mighty force of the militant, armed and organized fighters, fighting in the people's interest. The combination of armed self-defense with the clear understanding that the Klan is secretly supported by the bourgeoisie is what put the Klan on the run and made the bourgeoisie tremble. WE AFFIRM THE CORRECTNESS OF HOW TO FIGHT THE KLAN AS SHOWN BY CHINA GROVE!!!



Take a Stand! Smash the Klan! Expose the Misleaders!

For a hundred years the Klan has beaten, murdered and raped. They have shot and lynched thousands of Black people, tarred and feathered Black and White union organizers, ridden in the night shooting into people's homes. How do we fight these dogs?

Do we stay home behind closed doors and tremble? Do we say ridiculous things like, "This is a quarrel between two hate groups?" Do we make public statements to the press saying we deplore violence and then do nothing? This is the way the Reverends Quick, Washington and Hamilton in fact covered for the bloody history of the Klan and misled people after China Grove.

Let's be clear --what Reverends Quick, Washington and Hamilton did was to take the heat off the Klan and pave the way for the Klan to grow unchecked, allowing the Klan to put out their vicious hate teachings among brothers and sisters of the working class in Landis. This is what they objectively did, whether or not they intended it.

A Letter from the Workers Viewpoint Organization

Brothers and sisters at White Oak! Every month now we see the cost of food, fuel and heating oil sky rocketing and our buying power plummeting. The monopoly capitalists talk of replacing their puppet, Carter, with their 1980 model puppet, Kennedy. But fewer and fewer workers believe that capitalist government can solve the massive problems we face.

We all know we need to fight Cone for more in order to keep up with inflation. But with the ACTWU administratorship taking over our union, the struggle for higher wages right now is mostly out of our hands. So we are faced with the very difficult task of building a union at Cone, and the White Oak Organizing Committee is continuing to take this up. But the working class not only has to fight for our short term day to day needs like higher wages and better schools, but also the long term need to overthrow the whole capitalist system and replace it with a system run by the working class, Socialism.

We have been selling the WVO newspaper at White Oak for nearly four years. It provides a communist analysis so that workers can understand better how to carry out the struggles for our short and long term interests in the course of preparing to make revolution in this country. More and more workers are buying the paper because it tells the truth and because we see the WVO actually assuming leadership of the working class in our struggle for unions, for quality education for our children, and beating back the Klan.

Three months ago, the RCP (Revolutionary Communist Party) attacked a woman friend of WVO selling the newspaper. We returned that afternoon and whipped their tails bad. In last year's union drive at Cone's Eno plant, RCP was thrown off the organizing committee. In last year's strike at Granite Finishing Plant, the workers threw these scum RCP off the picket line and drove them out of Haw River. RCP spits on the struggle of workers for unions, they disrupt and wreck, they push the workers' preparation for revolution backward. These middle class crazies call themselves communists --revolutionary working class fighters-- but they are not genuine communists. Their stunts serve only Cone and his capitalist class.

Last week, an out of state pack of these goons and punks flew into town and went on a rampage trying to build themselves up -- storming into UNC-G classrooms, throwing paint, wrecking and confusing at Hampton Homes. Yesterday, twelve of these RCP cowards, armed with spiked clubs, attacked two White Oak workers who are close to the Workers Viewpoint Organization as they were leaving the mill. What RCP didn't count on was many brave White Oak workers who fought side by side with these WVO workers and we sent these mangy dogs running off with their tails between their legs.

The RCP is scum elements just like the Klan and need to be driven physically from the ranks of the workers. The workers need to get on with business of driving RCP from our midst, taking up the day to day fights and preparing to put the capitalist system in its grave. So we say. let's get on with it.

The Workers Viewpoint Organization

DATE: October 22, 1979

RE: AN OPEN LETTER TO JOE GRADY, GORRELL PIERCE, AND ALL KKK MEMBERS AND SYMPATHIZERS

Klansmen Joe Grady and Gorrell Pierce,

The KKK is one of the most treacherous scum elements produced by the dying system of capitalism. Your treacherousness is exceeded only by those who promote and secretly support you. You, as the so-called leaders deserve the full hatred and wrath of the people. Your program is based on lies and is being promoted to fan racial and national prejudices. It is used to turn worker against worker, white against black, Indians, or Chicano, Protestant against Catholic, or Jews. The Klan is being promoted to make it harder to fight this capitalist system which is the real source of the problems of the American people.

Grady and Pierce, you and your Klan followers put up a brave front. But when the surface is scratched, you are nothing but a bunch of racist cowards. Your militant front is calculated to attract whites and particularly white youths who are being crushed daily by this system and who are mad and looking for someone to fight. You hope to frighten and terrify blacks, Jews, and anyone who fights against this system. You don your hoods and run around with guns spreading your poison. But, as we showed in China Grove, the Klan is a bunch of cowards.

We are having a march and conference on November 3, 1979 to further expose your cowardness, why the Klan is so consciously being promoted, and to organize to physically smash the racist KKK wherever it rears its ugly head. Yes, we challenged you to attend our November 3rd rally in Greensboro. We publicly re-new that challenge. You were quoted in the AP press release as saying that "If the communists think they are going to get me to attack them, they are crazy as hell". No Grady and Pierce - we are not crazy. We are very clear on what you are doing and that you and the KKK are a bunch of two-bit cowards. You "invited" us to show up at Klan rallies. Grady and Pierce, we accept! Where in the hell are you holding your scum rallies? You cowards manage to keep the location of your rallies a secret. We challenge you to say in public where and when you hold your rallies so that the people can organize to chase you off the face of the earth.

It would be improper if we ended without emphasizing why the KKK is so treacherous. The Klan wants people to think that we are paying a dollar a gallon for gas and being laid off by the tens of thousands because of "niggers and Jews". At the same time, you say people won't work because they are lazy and that causes inflation. Who benefits from this vicious racist program of Klan lies? Certainly not white workers, white youth, or white people generally. Not Indians, black people, or chicanos. Grady and Pierce, only the rich, the ruling class, the capitalists benefit from what the Klan is doing.

What you do is disorganize ⁴⁴ people and make it difficult for workers and oppressed people of all races and national backgrounds to unite and fight together against the daily abuses of the capitalist system. But, in spite of your treacherousness, the Klan will be smashed physically. Grady and Pierce, all Klanspeople, and your Nazi friends - you are a temporary pest and obstruction in our fight to end all exploitation and oppression. But, we take you seriously and we will show you no mercy.


DEATH TO THE KLAN!!!

Workers Viewpoint Organization
(WVO)

DEATH TO THE KLAN

H

LOT
SOR
ITY CENTER
Lee Street




CONFERENCE

2:00 P.M.

ALL NATION PEN
HOLINESS CHURCH

1800 Freeman Mill

REVERSE SIDE
APPENDIX D
44



ANTI-KLAN MARCH AND CONFERENCE
SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 3, 1979
GREENSBORO, N.C.



HATED SYMBOL OF THE KLAN
GOES UP IN SMOKE IN CH
ROVE, N.C.

APPLICATION FOR PARADE PERMIT

APPENDIX E

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WORKING VIEWPOINT Org. hereby makes application for a permit to conduct a parade within the corporate limits of the City of Greensboro as provided by Chapter 12 of the Greensboro Code of Ordinances.

It is understood and agreed that any permit issued pursuant to this application is issued on condition that the answers to the following questions are true and correct to the best of the knowledge, information and belief of the applicant.

1. Name, address and telephone number of the person or organization applying for a parade permit. [Redacted]

2. If an organization, the names and addresses of the principal officers and management. [Redacted] Same As Above

3. Name, address and telephone number of the person who will be the parade chairman and who will be directly responsible for its conduct. [Redacted] Same As Above

4. The purposes, objectives and reasons for conducting such parade. Political + Education: To Educate + Organize Political Opposition to the KKK AND their Secret Supporters.

5. The time, including the date and the hours, when such parade shall commence and terminate. Sat 11-3-79 12 Noon - 2 PM

6. The route to be traveled, including the starting point, the termination point and the assembly areas for the parade See Attached Route

7. The approximate number of persons, animals and vehicles which will constitute such parade; the type of animals and description of the vehicles. 4 Vehicles - 1 to 200 persons

8. The interval of space to be maintained between units. NA

9. A statement as to whether the parade will occupy all or only a portion of the width of the streets proposed to be traversed. Portion

10. Such other information as may be required by the City Manager in order to fully determine that adequate provision can be made for the conduct of such parade. NO WEAPONS TO BE CARRIED IN PLAIN VIEW OR CONCEALED. Sign Posts NO Larger THAN 3" x 2".

Subscribed and sworn to before me, this 19th day of October, 1979.

45

[Redacted]
ry Public
y commission expires
January 30, 1984

Investigated by: [Signature]
Chief of Police

Traffic Engineer

This agreement is made this the 19 day of Oct, 1979,

by and between the City of Greensboro, hereinafter sometimes called party of the first part, and Worker Viewpoint, hereinafter sometimes called party of the second part,

WITNESSETH:

In consideration of the party of the first part's granting a parade or other permit to the party of the second part to hold or operate or manage or sponsor a Political Parade, the party of the second part agrees to release and hold the party of the first part harmless from any and all claims, lawsuits, causes of action or judgments or other remedies which a party who claims to have been injured or otherwise claims a remedy in law or equity as a result of, or as a part of, the event for which this parade or other permit was issued.

Furthermore, the party of the second part agrees that the City of Greensboro in issuing this permit has nothing to do with nor is in any way a sponsor of this event.


The party of the second part further agrees to indemnify the City of Greensboro for any claim or judgment or other remedy that a person or third party may secure or win or gain against the party of the first part.

This the 19 day of Oct, 1979.

ATTEST:

CITY OF GREENSBORO

Capt. 



PERMIT TO CONDUCT PARADE

Permit is hereby issued unto Workshop Viewpoint Org.
in accordance with
the provisions of Chapter 12, Section 90, of the Greensboro Code
of Ordinances to conduct a parade within the corporate limits of
the City of Greensboro for the following purposes: Political
& Education - To Educate & Organize Political Opposition To the KKK And
Their Secret Supporters

This permit is issued subject to the above activity being
performed in a lawful manner in compliance with all provisions
of the Greensboro Code of Ordinances and the laws of the State
of North Carolina and is further subject to the provisions specified
below:

1. The parade shall be conducted between the hours of 12:00
o'clock ~~A.M.~~/P.M. to 2:00 o'clock A.M./P.M. on the 3 day
of November, 1979, only.


2. The approximate number of persons to be engaged in such
activity shall not exceed 1 to 200; the person who will be in
direct charge is [redacted].

3. The route to be traveled shall be upon the following
streets: See Attached Sheet

The conduct of such parade shall be at all times subject to
the supervision and control of the Police Department of the City
of Greensboro.

NO WEAPONS TO BE CARRIED IN PLAIN VIEW OR CONCEALED. SIGN POSTS NO LARGER
THAN 2" x 2".

Issued this 31 day of October, 1979


T. Z. Osborne, City Manager

(APPENDIX E)

STARTING POINT: EVERETT ST & CARVER DR.

SOUTH ON DUNBAR ST. TO LEE ST.

WEST ON LEE ST. TO BENBOW RD.

SOUTH ON BENBOW RD. TO BRAGG ST.

WEST ON BRAGG ST. TO PASADENA ST.

SOUTH ON PASADENA ST. TO DECATUR ST.

SOUTH ON DECATUR ST. TO JULIAN ST.

WEST ON JULIAN ST. TO ASHEBORO ST.

SOUTH ON ASHEBORO ST. TO WHITTINGTON ST.

WEST ON WHITTINGTON ST. TO S. ELM - EUGENE ST.

SOUTH ON S. ELM - EUGENE TO DOAK ST.

WEST ON DOAK ST. TO OGDEN ST.

SOUTH ON OGDEN ST. TO FLAG ST.

SOUTH ON FLAG ST. TO SUSSMAN ST.

WEST ON SUSSMAN ST. TO ASH ST.

SOUTH ON ASH ST. TO FLORIDA ST.

WEST ON FLORIDA ST. TO FREEMAN MILL RD.

TERMINATION POINT,

Appendix F

WVO will march against Klan

The Workers Viewpoint Organization announced a "Death to the Klan" march and conference Thursday in a morning news conference.

The march, for which the WVO obtained a permit, will occur Saturday leaving at 11 a.m. from the Windsor Community Center.

Nelson Johnson, a spokesman for the WVO, also known as the Workers Communist Party, said he anticipates between 100 and 200 marchers.

Johnson accused city officials and police today of backing the Ku Klux Klan. "It's Jim Melvin and the City Council who are supporting the Klan," said Johnson.

He warned that the police and Melvin should, "Stay out of our way."

Greensboro Record

November 2, 1979

Appendix G

Attached you will find a copy of the laws and/or ordinances discussed by Police Attorney, [REDACTED] during a briefing session for officers of the Tactical Support Unit on November 3, 1979.

b6
b7C

§ 14-12.7. Wearing of masks, hoods, etc., on public ways. — No person or persons over sixteen years of age shall, while wearing any mask, hood or device whereby the person, face or voice is disguised so as to conceal the identity of the wearer, enter, be or appear upon any lane, walkway, alley, street, road, highway or other public way in this State. (1953, c. 1193, s. 6.)

§ 14-12.8. Wearing of masks, hoods, etc., on public property. — No person or persons shall in this State, while wearing any mask, hood or device whereby the person, face or voice is disguised so as to conceal the identity of the wearer, enter, or appear upon or within the public property of any municipality or county of the State, or of the State of North Carolina. (1953, c. 1193, s. 7.)

§ 14-12.9. Entry, etc., upon premises of another while wearing mask, hood or other disguise. — No person or persons over sixteen years of age shall, while wearing a mask, hood or device whereby the person, face or voice is disguised so as to conceal the identity of the wearer, demand entrance or admission, enter or come upon or into, or be upon or in the premises, enclosure or house of any other person in any municipality or county of this State. (1953, c. 1193, s. 8.)

§ 14-12.10. Holding meetings or demonstrations while wearing masks, hoods, etc. — No person or persons over sixteen years of age shall while wearing a mask, hood or device whereby the person, face or voice is disguised so as to conceal the identity of the wearer, hold any manner of meeting, or make any demonstration upon the private property of another unless such person or persons shall first obtain from the owner or occupier of the property his or her written permission to do so, which said written permission shall be recorded in the office of the register of deeds of the county in which said property is located before the beginning of such meeting or demonstration. (1953, c. 1193, s. 9.)

§ 14-12.11. Exemptions from provisions of article. — The following are exempted from the provisions of §§ 14-12.7, 14-12.8, 14-12.9, 14-12.10 and 14-12.14:

- (1) Any person or persons wearing traditional holiday costumes in season;
- (2) Any person or persons engaged in trades and employment where a mask is worn for the purpose of ensuring the physical safety of the wearer, or because of the nature of the occupation, trade or profession;
- (3) Any person or persons using masks in theatrical productions including use in Mardi Gras celebrations and masquerade balls;
- (4) Persons wearing gas masks prescribed in civil defense drills and exercises or emergencies; and
- (5) Any person or persons, as members or members elect of a society, order or organization, engaged in any parade, ritual, initiation, ceremony, celebration or requirement of such society, order or organization, and wearing or using any manner of costume, paraphernalia, disguise, facial makeup, hood, implement or device, whether the identity of such person or persons is concealed or not, on any public or private street, road, way or property, or in any public or private building, provided permission shall have been first obtained therefor by a representative of such society, order or organization from the governing body of the municipality in which the same takes place, or, if not in a municipality, from the board of county commissioners of the county in which the same takes place.

Provided, that the provisions of this article shall not apply to any preliminary meetings held in good faith for the purpose of organizing, promoting or forming a labor union or a local organization or subdivision of any labor union nor shall the provisions of this article apply to any meetings held by a labor union or organization already organized, operating and functioning and holding meetings for the purpose of transacting and carrying out functions, pursuits and affairs expressly pertaining to such labor union. (1953, c. 1193, s. 10.)

§ 14-277.1. Communicating threats. — (a) A person is guilty of a misdemeanor if without lawful authority:

- (1) He wilfully threatens to physically injure the person or damage the property of another;
- (2) The threat is communicated to the other person, orally, in writing, or by any other means;
- (3) The threat is made in a manner and under circumstances which would cause a reasonable person to believe that the threat is likely to be carried out; and
- (4) The person threatened believes that the threat will be carried out.

(b) A violation of this section is punishable by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars (\$500.00), imprisonment of not more than six months, or both. (1973, c. 1286, s. 11.)

**COMMON LAW — GOING ABOUT ARMED TO THE TERROR OF
THE PEOPLE**

1. Elements:

- a. Anyone who wilfully and intentionally
- b. arms himself with a dangerous weapon
- c. for the unlawful purpose of terrorizing persons is guilty of this offence.

2. Punishment: misdemeanor; discretionary fine and imprisonment up to two years. (State v. Dawson, 272 N.C. 535) (1967).

3. You may prefer charging the defendant with an assault, breach of the peace, or disorderly conduct.

§ 14-288.2. Riot; inciting to riot; punishments. — (a) A riot is a public disturbance involving an assemblage of three or more persons which by disorderly and violent conduct, or the imminent threat of disorderly and violent conduct, results in injury or damage to persons or property or creates a clear and present danger of injury or damage to persons or property.

(b) Any person who wilfully engages in a riot is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable as provided in § 14-3 (a).

(c) Any person who wilfully engages in a riot is guilty of a felony punishable by a fine not to exceed ten thousand dollars (\$10,000.00) or imprisonment for not more than five years, or both such fine and imprisonment, if:

(1) In the course and as a result of the riot there is property damage in excess of fifteen hundred dollars (\$1,500.00) or serious bodily injury; or

(2) Such participant in the riot has in his possession any dangerous weapon or substance.

(d) Any person who wilfully incites or urges another to engage in a riot, so that as a result of such inciting or urging a riot occurs or a clear and present danger of a riot is created, is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable as provided in § 14-3 (a).

(e) Any person who wilfully incites or urges another to engage in a riot, and such inciting or urging is a contributing cause of a riot in which there is property damage in excess of fifteen hundred dollars (\$1,500.00) or serious bodily injury, is guilty of a felony punishable as provided in § 14-2. (1969, c. 869, s. 1.)

§ 14-288.4. Disorderly conduct. — (a) Disorderly conduct is a public disturbance intentionally caused by any person who:

- (1) Engages in fighting or other violent conduct or in conduct creating the threat of imminent fighting or other violence; or
- (2) Makes or uses any utterance, gesture, display or abusive language which is intended and plainly likely to provoke violent retaliation and thereby cause a breach of the peace; or
- (3) Takes possession of, exercises control over, or seizes any building or facility of any public or private educational institution without the specific authority of the chief administrative officer of the institution, or his authorized representative; or
- (4) Refuses to vacate any building or facility of any public or private educational institution in obedience to:
 - a. An order of the chief administrative officer of the institution, or his authorized representative; or
 - b. An order given by any fireman or public health officer acting within the scope of his authority; or
 - c. If a state of emergency is occurring or is imminent within the institution, an order given by any law-enforcement officer acting within the scope of his authority; or
- (5) Shall, after being forbidden to do so by the chief administrative officer, or his authorized representative, of any public or private educational institution:
 - a. Engage in any sitting, kneeling, lying down, or inclining so as to obstruct the ingress or egress of any person entitled to the use of any building or facility of the institution in its normal and intended use; or
 - b. Congregate, assemble, form groups or formations (whether organized or not), block, or in any manner otherwise interfere with the operation or functioning of any building or facility of the institution so as to interfere with the customary or normal use of the building or facility; or
- (6) Disrupts, disturbs or interferes with the teaching of students at any public or private educational institution or engages in conduct which disturbs the peace, order or discipline at any public or private educational institution or on the grounds adjacent thereto.

As used in this section the term "building or facility" includes the surrounding grounds and premises of any building or facility used in connection with the operation or functioning of such building or facility.

(b) Any person who willfully engages in disorderly conduct is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not to exceed five hundred dollars (\$500.00)

§ 13-12 OFFENSES AND MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS § 13-12

- (13) *Noises to attract attention.* The use of any drum, loudspeaker, or other instrument for the purpose of attracting attention by creation of noise to any performance, show, sale, display, or advertisement of merchandise.
- (13.1) *Blowers, engines.* The operation of any noise-creating blower, power fan, or any internal combustion engine, the operation of which causes noise due to the explosion of operating gases or fluids, unless the noise emitting therefrom is sufficiently muffled and the engine is equipped with a muffler device sufficient to deaden such noise, so that the same shall not cause annoyance to the public nor unreasonably disturb the rest and quiet of persons on adjacent premises or within the vicinity thereof.
- (13.2) *Appliances and other mechanical devices.* The operation of any noise-producing appliance or other mechanical device which, due to operational deficiencies, malfunction or other type of disrepair, causes loud and excessive noises in such a manner as to unreasonably annoy the public or disturb the rest and quiet of persons on adjacent premises or within the vicinity thereof.
- (14) *Loudspeakers or amplifiers on vehicles.* The use of mechanical loudspeakers or amplifiers on trucks, airplanes, or other vehicles for advertising or other purposes. Provided that in the exercise of free speech, loudspeakers or amplifiers may be used for non-commercial purposes under the following conditions:
- (a) No wires or other materials or connections for the transmission of power or for other purposes shall be placed on any street, sidewalk or on the ground in any public park or public place. Any such wires, materials, or connections shall be placed not less than seven (7) feet above the street, sidewalk or ground except at the point of connection to the loudspeaker or amplifier.
 - (b) It shall be unlawful for any person to speak into a loudspeaker or amplifier within the corporate limits of the city, when such loudspeaker or amplifier is so adjusted that the voice of the speaker is amplified to the extent that it is audible at distance in excess of one hundred and fifty (150) feet from the person speaking. Provided that the Guilford County health department may, upon obtaining a permit approved by the council, use loudspeakers or amplifiers as a part of its educational campaign. (Code 1955, § 13.3; Ord. No. 9A, § 1, 8-1-55; Ord. No. 118A, § 1, 3-19-56; Ord. No. 60-42, § 1, 4-28-60; Ord. No. 61-86, § 1, 8-7-61; Ord. No. 62-27, § 1, 4-2-62; Ord. No. 68-105, §§ 1-5, 10-7-68)

Amendment note—Ord. No. 68-105, §§ 1-5, amended § 13-12 by revising (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(4), (b)(5) and by adding (b)(13.1) and (13.2).

(APPENDIX G)

Sec. 13-3. Discharging firearms prohibited; exceptions.

It shall be unlawful to fire any pistol, gun, or other firearm within the areas defined in section 13-15 except in shooting galleries or in the discharge of duty by law enforcement officers or by hunters authorized to hunt or shoot game in the area embracing Lake Brandt and Lake Higgins and the land owned by the city surrounding Lake Brandt and Lake Higgins. (Code 1955, § 10.2; Ord. No. 385A, § 1, 7-1-57)

Sec. 13-16. Property—Injuring, defacing, etc., city owned property.

It shall be unlawful, wilfully or negligently to injure, deface, mutilate, destroy, tamper or interfere with any city owned property or any property used in the city's water, sewer, police or fire alarm system. (Code 1955, §§ 15.1 and 15.3)

State law references—For state law provision relating to malicious injury to real property, see G.S. § 14-127; personal property, § 14-160.

Sec. 12-90. Parades regulated.

(A) DEFINITIONS.

- (1) *Parade* is any parade, march, ceremony, show or procession of any kind, exhibition or any similar display, in or upon any street, sidewalk or other public place in the city.
- (2) *Parade permit* is a written authorization as required by this section.
- (3) *Person* is any person, firm, partnership, association, corporation, company or organization of any kind.

(B) PERMIT REQUIRED.

No person shall engage in, participate in, aid, form or start any parade unless a permit shall have been obtained from the city manager. Provided, no person may conduct or otherwise participate in any parade except between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 9:00 p.m. only, Mondays through Saturdays.

- (1) *Exceptions.* This section shall not apply to funeral processions or to a government agency.

(C) APPLICATION.

A person seeking issuance of a parade permit shall file an application with the city manager on forms provided by the city.

- (1) *Filing period.* An application for a parade permit shall be filed with the city manager not less than seventy-two (72) hours before the time when it is proposed to conduct the parade. Provided, however, that a permit may be issued if filed less than seventy-two (72) hours before the time for commencement of the parade when the city manager finds that adequate provision can be made to handle such parade within the period between the filing of the application and time for commencement of the parade.
- (2) *Contents.* The application for a parade permit shall set forth the following information:
 - (a) The name, address and telephone number of the person seeking to conduct such parade;
 - (b) If the parade is proposed to be conducted for, on behalf of, or by an organization, the name, address and telephone number of the headquarters of the organization, and of the authorized and responsible heads of such organization;
 - (c) The name, address and telephone number of the person who will be the parade chairman and who will be responsible for its conduct;
 - (d) The date when the parade is to be conducted;
 - (e) The route to be traveled, the starting point and the termination point;

- (f) The approximate number of persons who, and animals and vehicles which, will constitute such parade; the type of animals and description of the vehicles;
- (g) The hours when such parade will start and terminate;
- (h) A statement as to whether the parade will occupy all or only a portion of the width of the streets proposed to be traversed;
- (i) The location by streets of any assembly area for such parade;
- (j) The time at which units of the parade will begin to assemble at any such assembly area or areas;
- (k) The interval of space to be maintained between units of such parade;
- (l) If the parade is designed to be held by, and on behalf of or for any person other than the applicant, the applicant for such permit shall file with the city manager a communication in writing from the person proposing to hold the parade, authorizing the applicant to apply for the permit on his behalf;
- (m) Any additional information which the city manager shall find reasonably necessary to a fair determination as to whether a permit should be issued.

RADIO TRAFFIC ON FREQUENCY 1

10:52.01	F-1	F-1-Op:	[]
.03	F-1	[]	[] check myself and [] out on Special Assignment at Windsor Center.
.10	F-1	F-1-Op:	10-4, be you and []
.15	F-1	[]	10-4, and [] will be coming over this way.
.23	F-1	F-1-Op:	10-4.
11:00.07	F-1	[]	[] see if you have contact with []
.11	F-1	F-1-Op:	[]
.18	F-1	___:	[]
.23	F-1	F-1-Op:	Have contact []
.26	F-1	[]	See if he can go to four a minute.
.28	F-1	F-1-Op:	[] F-4.
.30	F-1	[]	10-4.
11:00.36	F-4	[]	[] to []
.38	F-4	[]	Go ahead, []
.40	F-4	[]	[] just for information, we made contact at Windsor. Oh, the group is very hostile towards the police, what have you, no one would talk with us. Of course, we informed them of what they can and can't do and that we are gonna have one leading and one following the parade up. They are, of course, requesting no police whatsoever. But, they have already been instructed that we will stop the traffic and that one will be leading and one will be following.
11:01.17	F-4	[]	Was that contact made with []?

11:01.22	F-4	[]	10-74. It was some female there and some other man whom they did not wish to identify themselves. I don't think he showed up yet.
.36	F-4	[]	10-4, check back later and attempt to make contact with [] himself cause he's the one the permit is issued.
.49	F-4	[]	10-4.
11:02.28	F-1	[]	[] 10-7.
.33	F-1	F-1-Op: []	
.34	F-1	[]:	Code 1 meal P.D.
.37	F-1	F-1-Op: []	10-4.
11:03.15	F-1	F-1-Op: Car []?	
.19	F-1	[]:	Dudley School.
.21	F-1	F-1-Op:	Pick up Reserve Ariail underground.
.24	F-1	[]:	10-4.
11:04.14	F-1	[]:	[] 10-7.
.16	F-1	F-1-Op:	Car []?
.18	F-1	[]:	Code 4, special assignment at Windsor Center. Have [] advise 10-20.
.23	F-1	F-1-Op: []?	
.24	F-1	[]:	Go to four a minute.
.30	F-1	[]:	Is that four?
.31	F-1	[]:	10-4.
.33	F-1	[]:	10-4.
.36	F-4	[]:	[] on four.
.38	F-4	[]:	Where are you now, []
.40	F-4	[]:	Lee and Benbow.
.43	F-4	[]:	Come on over to Washington Street School for a minute.
.45	F-4	[]:	10-4.

11:13.41	F-1	[]:	Car [] .
.43	F-1	F-1-Op:	[] ?
.44	F-1	[]:	Reserve Ariail, Badge [] , 10-41.
.50	F-1	F-1-Op:	10-4.
11:14.31	F-1	F-1-Op:	Car [] ?
.36	F-1	[]:	[] .
.40	F-1	F-1-Op:	Advise a number or 10-21 Communications.
.45	F-1	[]:	10-4.
11:15.45	F-1	F-1-Op:	Car [] ?
11:17.54	F-1	[]:	[] ?
.59	F-1	F-1-Op:	Unit calling?
11:18.01	F-1	[]:	[] see if you have radio contact with [] .
.04	F-1	F-1-Op:	Car []
.12	F-1	F-1-Op:	Car [] ?
11:18.17	F-1	F-1-Op:	[] , no contact.
.19	F-1	[]:	[] , 10-4.
11:20.57	F-1	[]:	[] to [] .
11:21.01	F-1	[]:	Go ahead.
.02	F-1	[]:	F-3.
.03	F-1	[]:	10-4.
11:23.50	F-1	F-1-Op:	[] , [] , and [] , Everitt and Carver, move into the area, have a 10-10, possible shots fired, just move into the area and stand by.
11:24.00	F-1	[]:	10-4.
11:24.03	F-1	[]:	10-9 the address.
11:24.07	F-1	F-1-Op:	Everitt and Carver.
11:24.28	F-1	F-1-Op:	[] , [] and [] switch to F-3.
.32	F-1	[]:	10-4.

11:24.35	F-1	[]	10-4.
.40	F-1	[]	[], 10-8.
11:25.41	F-1	F-1-Op:	[]
.45	F-1	[]	Lindsay and Bessemer.
.46	F-1	F-1-Op:	Go ahead and move into area of Everitt and Carver, switch to F-3.
.49	F-1	[]	[] 10-4.
.51	F-1	[]	(and several other cars call at same time, can't understand.)
11:26.07	F-1	[]	[] and other cars at once. (Can't understand.)
11:26.17	F-1	F-1-Op:	Any unit moving into Everitt and Carver, there are automatic weapons in the yellow van.
.23	F-1	[]	[] 10-8.
11:26.58	F-1	[]	[]
11:27.02	F-1	F-1-Op:	Unit calling?
11:27.06	F-1	[]	[]
.17	F-1	F-1-Op:	[]
.19	F-1	[]	[] have all units on F-1 switch to F-3 and seal off the Carver and Everitt St. area, wide perimeter.
11:27.28	F-1	F-1-Op:	All units in service on F-1 switch to F-3, we need to seal off the Everitt and Carver St. area, all units on F-1 switch to F-3 and shut off the Carver and Everitt St. area, authority of []
11:27.47	F-1	[]	[] clear me Code 1 and I'll be in the area.
.51	F-1	F-1-Op:	[]
.53	F-1	[]	Car [] going to F-3.
.55	F-1	F-1-Op:	10-4.

11:28.00	F-1	<input type="text"/>	How many ambulances you got en route down here?
.02	F-1	F-1-Op:	As far as I know, I only have one en route, you need more than one?
.05	F-1	<input type="text"/>	10-4, send at least 3, in the vicinity and then stand by, but get one in here in the immediate area right away.
11:28.17	F-1	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
.30	F-1	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
.32	F-1	F-1-Op:	Unit calling?
11:28.55	F-1	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
.58	F-1	F-1-Op:	Unit calling?
11:29.00	F-1	<input type="text"/>	Be clearing call, switching to 3.
.02	F-1	F-1-Op:	<input type="text"/>
11:29.05	F-1	<input type="text"/>	10-24, Code 4.
.07	F-1	F-1-Op:	<input type="text"/>
.10	F-1	<input type="text"/> & <input type="text"/>	Calls.
.13	F-1	F-1-Op:	Have a 10-10, with shots fired Everitt and Carver reference to this march, go ahead and switch over.
11:29.18	F-1	<input type="text"/>	10-4?
.32	F-1	F-1-Op:	Unit calling?
11:30.09	F-1	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
.11	F-1	F-1-Op:	Go ahead.
.13	F-1	<input type="text"/>	You want me to go ahead and clear special assignment?
.15	F-1	F-1-Op:	10-4.
.17	F-1	F-1-Op:	10-4.
.18	F-1	(Short, garbled phone conversation.)	
.19	F-1	<input type="text"/>	10-8.

11:31.01	F-1	F-1-Op:	<input type="text"/>
.05	F-1	F-1-Op:	<input type="text"/>
.08	F-1	F-1-Op:	<input type="text"/>
11:31.12	F-1	F-1-Op:	Any unit on F-1?
.18	F-1	F-1-Op:	Any unit on F-1?
.31	F-1	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> to Communications.
.32	F-1	F-1-Op:	<input type="text"/> go ahead.
.34	F-1	<input type="text"/>	Need a second ambulance down here.
.36	F-1	F-1-Op:	10-4, ambulances are en route.
.37	F-1	<input type="text"/>	10-4.
11:32.01	F-1	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
.04	F-1	F-1-Op:	<input type="text"/>
.05	F-1	<input type="text"/>	Go ahead, Everitt Street.
.08	F-1	F-1-Op:	10-4. 10-25 the P.D., pick up the keys to the paddy wagon and return to the scene.
.14	F-1	<input type="text"/>	10-4.

RADIO TRAFFIC ON FREQUENCY 3

11:02.27	F-3	[]	[] 10-41.
.35	F-3	F-3-Op:	[]
11:05.43	F-3	[]	[]
.49	F-3	F-3-Op:	Is that []?
.51	F-3	[]	10-4. You got contact with [], correction, []
.57	F-3	F-3-Op:	Car []
11:06.01	F-3	[]	Correction, [] My mistake.
.04	F-3	F-3-Op:	[] . . . negative.
.12	F-3	[]	10-4, how about []?
.16	F-3	F-3-Op:	[]
.20	F-3	F-3-Op:	[]
.22	F-3	[]	He's still in the office.
.23	F-3	F-3-Op:	10-4.
.25	F-3	[]	Go to . . . you got a 6, []?
.30	F-3	[]	No Sir.
.33	F-3	[]	Go to four.
.35	F-3	[]	10-4.
.37	F-4	[]	Go ahead, []
.39	F-4	[]	Okay, you got 8 vehicles parked and loaded on the ramp from down where we went this morning. They're on the ramp of 85 and 220. It looks like about 30 or 35 people, maybe not that many in the vehicles. They're just sitting on the ramp there waiting, all in the vehicles. So, we're gonna stand by here and kinda monitor them, see what they do.
11:07.13	F-4	[]	10-4. You copy, _____?
11:10.28	F-3	[]	[]
.29	F-3	F-3-Op:	Go ahead.
.30	F-3	[]	Information: Myself, [] and [] is now on F-3 working.

.36	F-3	F-3-Op:	10-4.
.48	F-3	[]	[]
.49	F-3	F-3-Op:	Go ahead.
.50	F-3	[]	[] go to four a minute.
.52	F-3	F-3-Op:	[]?
.55	F-3	[]	10-4, what unit is that?
.57	F-3	F-3-Op:	[]
11:11.02	F-4	[]	[] to []
.06	F-4	[]	10-4, [] information only, we got about 8 vehicles the opposite side parked on the ramp at 85 and 220, headed your direction. However, they're stationary at this time. We'll have further if they move in.
.33	F-4	[]	10-4, that's 85 and 220?
.36	F-4	[]	10-4. They're standing, they're just stationary now.
.41	F-4	[]	10-4.
.50	F-3	[]	[] to []
.54	F-3	[]	[] I don't think he's in the car yet?
.58	F-3	[]	Is this []?
11:12.00	F-3	[]	10-4.
.02	F-3	[]	Did you copy traffic on four?
.04	F-3	[]	Yeah, he gave it to us about 5 minutes ago.
.06	F-3	[]	10-4. For information, they're pretty hostile over here at Windsor, refusing to talk to us, what have you . . . can you see me at Washington School for a minute?
.21	F-3	[]	It will probably be 10 minutes before I can get there from where I'm at. Will that be alright?
.27	F-3	[]	Just 10-22, are you on Lincoln?

.34	F-3	[]	Nah, I'm gonna be down at the "Big G Place."
.39	F-3	[]	10-4. Just 10-22. I'll see you later.
11:13.43	F-3	[]	[]
.44	F-3	F-3-Op:	Go ahead.
.45	F-3	[]	Direct to []
.47	F-3	F-3-Op:	Go ahead.
.49	F-3	[]	Go ahead, []
.51	F-3	[]	We're rolling now, headed that direction from this location. There's a total now of 9 vehicles.
.59	F-3	[]	10-4.
11:14.05	F-3	[]	_____ go back to four.
.06	F-3	[]	10-4.
.10	F-4	[]	Go ahead.
.14	F-4	[]	[] called a minute ago and said the bunch where he's at is real hostile and belligerent, what have you Just for your information.
.19	F-4	[]	10-4. Ah, we're gonna have to wait and see. They're definitely headed in that direction.
.29	F-4	[]	10-4.
.32	F-3	F-3-Op:	Car []?
11:15.00	(Telephone)	This is []	Lt. [] do you have contact with him?
		F-3-Op:	We're trying to raise him.
		E.E.W.:	Where are the people who are listening in on that thing?
		F-3-Op:	They transferred him up there. He's talked to him before you got him.
		E.E.W.:	He did?
		F-3-Op:	Evidently he was saying he didn't want the march to end there.

		<input type="text"/>	Ok, have him give me a call.
	F-3-Op:		Ok.
		<input type="text"/>	Ok. <input type="text"/> checked in yet?
	F-3-Op:		We've got him, he's supposed to be calling. He's just getting in his car now, give him another call.
		<input type="text"/>	Ok, tell him to contact me, ok?
	F-3-Op:		Ok.
.30	F-3	F-3-Op:	Car <input type="text"/> ?
.36	F-3	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> .
.37	F-3	F-3-Op:	Go ahead.
.39	F-3	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> , go to four.
.42	F-3	<input type="text"/>	10-4.
.46	F-4	<input type="text"/>	Go ahead, <input type="text"/>
.47	F-4	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> called. He's got 9 vehicles headed in that direction from where we were a while ago, said it's about 30 to 35 people and <input type="text"/> called you and said the group he's got is right boisterous and belligerent, already before anybody got there.
11:16.03	F-4	<input type="text"/>	10-4. They headed in the direction of the starting point?
.06	F-4	<input type="text"/>	That's what <input type="text"/> said. He's been keeping me advised.
.10	F-4	<input type="text"/>	10-4. Be alert to shift over that way if we give you a call.
.17	F-4	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> to <input type="text"/>
.18	F-4	<input type="text"/>	Go ahead.
.20	F-4	<input type="text"/>	10-4, on 29 now, approaching Florida Street.
.24	F-4	<input type="text"/>	10-4. <input type="text"/> are ya'll in position?
.29	F-4	<input type="text"/>	Not really. We can start that way, most of us jumped out to get a sandwich or something.

.35	F-4	[]	10-4. They got 14 more minutes according to my watch, rush 'em up.
.41	F-4	[]	10-4.
11:17.04	F-3	[]	[]
.05	F-3	F-3-Op:	Go ahead.
.06	F-3	[]	Do you have radio contact with []?
.08	F-3	F-3-Op:	[]
.15	F-3	F-3-Op:	[]
.18	F-3	F-3-Op:	No contact.
.20	F-3	[]	10-4.
.45	F-3	[]	[] to [] just made the turnoff onto Lee Street.
11:18.00	F-3	[]	[] to []
.06 to .34	F-3		Blocked by non-related telephone conversation.
.57	F-3	[]	Turning on Willow Road now.
11:19.07	F-3	[]	[] to Communications.
.08	F-3	F-3-Op:	Go ahead.
.09	F-3	[]	We talking car-to-car on 3?
.12	F-3	F-3-Op:	10-4.
.14	F-3	[]	10-4. [] to [] I copied direct.
.16	F-3	[]	10-4.
.19	F-3	[]	[] to []
.20	F-3	[]	Go ahead.
.21	F-3	[]	[] knows, we told him.
.22	F-3	[]	10-4. Let's hustle on into those positions.
.26	F-3	[]	10-9?
.28	F-3	[]	Let's hustle on in and get in those positions because they're moving before we anticipated.

.32	F-3	<input type="text"/>	10-4. We're on the way.
.53	F-3	<input type="text"/>	One to three, we are talking car-to-car on 3.
.56	F-3	<input type="text"/>	10-4. I copied.
11:20.01	F-3	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> to <input type="text"/> you copy?
.07	F-3	<input type="text"/>	10-4.
.14	F-3	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> to <input type="text"/> part of them should be there by now almost.
.19	F-3	<input type="text"/>	10-4.
.21	F-3	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> to <input type="text"/> you copy?
.31	F-3	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> to Communications, see if you raise <input type="text"/>
11:20.34	F-3	F-3-Op:	Car <input type="text"/>
.38	F-3	F-3-Op:	Car <input type="text"/>
.41	F-3	F-3-Op:	No contact.
.44	F-3	<input type="text"/>	10-4.
.52	F-3	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> to <input type="text"/> they're parking up on Everitt Street at Willow Road.
11:21.09	F-3	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> to <input type="text"/>
.16	F-3	<input type="text"/>	Go ahead, _____.
.20	F-3	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> to <input type="text"/> you been copying the traffic of <input type="text"/>
.24	F-3	<input type="text"/>	Negative, I've been on the phone. I need to get with you. Another thing just popped up you need to be made aware of.
.33	F-3	<input type="text"/>	10-4.
.35	F-3	<input type="text"/>	Where you at?
.38	F-3	<input type="text"/>	Washington and Benbow.
.43	F-3	<input type="text"/>	Meet me there about the old train station.
.48	F-3	<input type="text"/>	10-4.
.54	F-3	S.D.O. to E.E.W.:	I've advised Lt. <input type="text"/> of that problem and he's meeting with Lt. <input type="text"/> and they are going to discuss it.

		F-3-Op:	Right.
11:22.02	F-3	[]	[] to [] they're now at the formation point.
.15	F-3	[]	[] to []
.18	F-3	[]	[] go.
.20	F-3	[]	Your talking on What traffic you got going?
11:22.25 to 11:23.01 (36 seconds)	F-3	[]	Ok, we got about 9 or 10 cars on the opposite side has now arrived at the formation point for the parade and it appears as though they're heckling at this time, driving on by, uh, they're definitely creating attention and some of the parade members are, uh, (break in transmission) . . 10-4, they're scattering, stand by one.
11:23.03 to .10 (7 seconds)	F-3	[]	[] interrupted with non-related transmission)
.10 to .14 (4 seconds)	F-3	[]	[] we've got a 10-10 down here, you better get some units in here.
.16 to .20 (4 seconds)	F-3	[]	[] go ahead and,, [] to [] your people in position over there?
.22	F-3	[]	10-4. [] to []
.23	F-3	[]	[] en route from 85 and 220.
.26	F-3	[]	10-4.
.27	F-3	[]:	[] shots fired, (it) sounds like
.31 to .33 (2 seconds)	F-3	[]	Move the (District II) cars into the area.
.37	F-3	[]	[] to [] move in.
.39	F-3	[]	On the way . . . Come on, []
.41 to .42 (2 seconds)	F-3	F-3-Op:	Can you advise for F-1 where you want the (District II) cars?

.43 to .46 (3 seconds)	F-3	[]	Move 'em into the area, . . . , should be there at Windsor Community Center.
.47 to .49 (2 seconds)	F-3	[]	[] heavy gunfire.
.51 to 11:24.02 (11 seconds)	F-3	[]	[] pull all available cars in the city to the area of . . . , the Windsor Community Center. Don't all come to the area, I'll advise further when I arrive on the scene.
11:24.02	F-3	[]	Just use the Tact units, . . . the ones on F-3 . . . both Tactical squads.
11:24.11	F-3	F-3-Op:	You advise you do want the patrol on 3?
.14	F-3	[]	It's not at Windsor, I think they're at Everitt and Carver where . . . , the Tact units are at. We're with the group at Windsor, no problem.
.29 to .42 (13 seconds)	F-3	[]	[] most of the fire is coming from the yellow van, coming from the yellow van, they're now leaving the scene. (Lost due to overlapping phone conversation from resident of Everitt Street.)
.36	F-3 (Telephone)	F-3-Op:	Police Fire Emergency.
.37	F-3	Male Caller:	Have you had any calls for Everitt Street, there's a lot of shooting going on over here.
.40	F-3	F-3-Op:	Yeah, we do, they're on the way.
.42	F-3	Male Caller:	All right.
.44	F-3 (Telephone)	F-3-Op:	Police Fire Emergency.
.45	F-3	Female Caller:	(Undecipherable.)
.45	F-3	F-3-Op:	Police Fire Emergency (several times).
.46	F-3	[]	[] to [] we'll stay on 29, (lost). if the van comes out, we'll try . . .
.48	F-3 (Telephone)	F-3-Op:	Police Fire Emergency.

.53 F-3 Female Caller: This the Police Department?

.54 F-3 F-3-Op: Yeah.

.55 F-3 Female Caller: Would you please send someone over here in the Morningside Homes . . .

.58 F-3 F-3-Op: Yeah, they're on the way, ma'am.

11:25.00 F-5 (Telephone) Telecommunicator: Yeah.

S.D.O. to E.E.W.: Captain [] Acting Commander of F.O.B., has been notified of that thing and he will be en route in case there is a question.

Telecommunicator: Okay, we've got the Chief down here in the E.O.C. right now. Captain [] going to be, Captain [] en route?

E.E.W.: Yeah, okay then.

Telecommunicator: Just advise them, [] (Speaking to [])

E.E.W.: Okay, fine, okay.

Telecommunicator: Is he en route down there to the P.D., or is he . . .

E.E.W.: He said he would be en route, he didn't say where.

Telecommunicator: He just said he was going to be en route, didn't say to where.

E.E.W.: But, I advised him of the thing down at . . . where . . . it's around Windsor Community Center.

Telecommunicator: Yeah.

E.E.W.: Okay.

Telecommunicator: They just, I was getting ready to go out to lunch and they called me back. I don't know exactly what happened, so, there were shots fired somewhere.

[]

Well, from what I understand 9 or 10 of the opposite side arrived, started heckling, then there was a 10-10 started, and then the shots were fired.

Telecommunicator: Uh-huh.

[]

Appreciate it.

11:25.00	F-3	Female Caller:	They're over here shooting . . .
.01	F-3	F-3-Op:	Yeah, I know it. They're on the way.
.03	F-3	Female Caller:	Oh, my God . . . Please . . .
.10	F-3	F-3-Op:	Ma'am . . . Ma'am? (Broken transmission)
.19	F-3	[]	[] send ambulances Carver and Everitt.
.21	F-3	F-3-Op:	10-4.
.24	F-3	[]	[](?), you better send several.
.27	F-3	[]	[] we got the van on Everitt, get some help.
.32	F-3	[]	[] in the area.
.37	F-3	[]	Car [] . . . 10-23.
.38	F-3	[]	[] . . . (out?).
.53	F-3	[]	Get me an ambulance down here . . . several ambulances.
.57	F-3	F-3-Op:	Calls ambulance Service (Garbled)
.58	F-3	[]	[], advise cars (lost) . . . in the yellow van, automatic weapons in the yellow van.
11:26.02	F-3	Ambulance Service:	Where you need the ambulance at?
.04	F-3	F-3-Op:	Everitt and Carver.
.06	F-3	Ambulance Service:	Everitt and Carver.
.08	F-3	Ambulance Service:	All right, we've got one on the way.
.10	F-3	F-3-Op:	Are you aware of the situation we have over there?
.11	F-3	Ambulance Service:	Yes Sir.

.12	F-3	F-3-Op:	Ok.
.12	F-3	Ambulance Service:	Bye Bye.
11:26.24	F-3	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
.25	F-3	F-3-Op:	<input type="text"/>
.26	F-3	<input type="text"/>	Signal 50.
.27	F-3	F-3-Op:	Haven't been advised yet, any unit advising Signal 50?
.32	F-3	F-3-Op:	No one has.
.35	F-3	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> They're Signal 50.
.37	F-3	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> Signal 50 at this time, no other cars.
.40	F03	F-3-Op:	<input type="text"/> and <input type="text"/> advise Signal 50 at this time.
.44	F-3	<input type="text"/>	10-23 in the area.
.46	F-3	F-3-Op:	<input type="text"/> 10-4, Ambulance is clearing to Everitt and Carver.
.53	F-3	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> to <input type="text"/>
11:27.02	F-3	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> information, 5 wounded, 5 wounded.
.07	F-3	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> to <input type="text"/>
.11	F-3	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> go ahead 3.
.14	F-3	<input type="text"/>	You want to try to stop some of those other cars that were leaving, the other members.
.20	F-3	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> to <input type="text"/>
.22	F-3	<input type="text"/>	Go ahead.
.23	F-3	<input type="text"/>	(Lost) that church there at McConnell and Lincoln.
.28	F-3	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> to <input type="text"/>
.34	F-3	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> to <input type="text"/>
.39	F-3	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> go ahead.
.42	F-3	<input type="text"/>	McConnell and Lincoln is where he said he wanted the van, uh, your truck.

11:27.47 F-3 [] 10-9 location?

.49 F-3 [] He said McConnell and Lincoln Street at the church.

.51 F03 [] [] 10-4, we're en route.

.51 F-3 (Telephone) F-3-Op: Police Fire Emergency.

.53 F-3 Male Caller: Uh, Yes Sir, I wanted to get a patrolman to check out a school bus that's been vandalized.

.54 F-3 [] []

.55 F-3 [] []

.39 F-3 (Supervisor) F-3-S: 10-4, []

11:28.00 F-3 (Supervisor) F-3-S: [], you calling Communications?

.02 F-3 Male Caller: It's [] Bus and you need to see []

.06 F-3 [] []

.12 F-3 (Supervisor) F-3-S: Go ahead, [] . . . []

.15 F-3 [] (Lost) Injured people at Everitt and Carver, we've got about four, we need some help down there.

.15 F-3 F-3-Op: Okay, about what?

.18 F-3 Caller: Sir?

.19 F-3 F-3-Op: Called ambulance service for the ambulance. They are already on the way.

11:28.20 F-3 (Supervisor) F-3-S: Need more assistance at Everitt and Carver, is that correct?

.23 F-3 [] 10-4.

.23 F-3 Caller: About a school bus that's being vandalized.

.23 F-3 F-3-Op: Okay, it's on []

.25 F-3 Caller: Right, it's []

.28 F-3 F-3-Op: Okay, we'll have somebody come by.

.28 F-3 Caller: Appreciate it.

.28 F-3 [] [] same (lost).

.33 F-3 F-3-S: 10-4, []
(Supervisor)

.33 F-3 [] [] also.

.34 F-3 F-3-S: [] 10-4.
(Supervisor)

.38 F-3 [] (?) Will be en route.

.39 F-3 F-3-S: 10-4. []
(Supervisor)

.44 F-3 [] (Lost) units that's coming . . .
(lost).

.51 F-3 F-3-S: [] advise again?
(Supervisor)

.53 F-3 F-3-S: Dunbar from McConnell to Everitt.
(Supervisor)

.56 F-3 F-3-S: Dunbar, McConnell to Everitt -
(Supervisor) the responding units.

11:29.02 F-3 [] Are you calling?

.05 F-3 F-3-S: 10-4, are you aware of the
(Supervisor) situation there (with) []

11:29.11 F-3 [] [] (garbled) Is that Everitt and
Carver?

.14 F-3 F-3-S: Go ahead, []
(Supervisor)

.16 F-3 [] Are you talking about the situation
at Everitt and Carver?

.17 F-3 F-3-S: That's correct.
(Supervisor)

.18 F-3 [] []

.20 F-3 [] Blocked out.

.22 F-3 F-3-S: [] go ahead.
(Supervisor)

.25 F-3 203: (Garbled) . . . to come in on
Dunbar off of McConnell. We've
got Everitt blocked at Gillespie.

.30	F-3 (Supervisor)	F-3-S:	Come down Dunbar from McConnell responding to [] location, Dunbar from McConnell, Everitt is blocked, authority of []
.41	F-3	___:	10-4.
.43	F-3	___:	. . . Come on the other side of the church.
.50	F-3 (Supervisor)	F-3-S:	I've got multiple units, [] it's clear for your traffic.
.53	F-3	[]	[] we're gonna have a possible homicide; give us all the assistance you can get at Dunbar and Everitt to keep this crowd back.
11:30.02	F-3 (Supervisor)	F-3-S:	Alert Tone: All units available move into the area of Dunbar and Everitt to assist in crowd control, authority of [] . . . you responding?
.16	F-3	[]	Be out at Dunbar and Everitt.
.18	F-3 (Supervisor)	F-3-S:	[] 10-4.
11:30.27	F-3	[]	[] F-4.
.29	F-3 (Supervisor)	F-3-S:	[] I am on four, go ahead.
.35	F-3	[]	[] 10-23 in the area.
.37	F-3 (Supervisor)	F-3-S:	[] 10-4.
.50	F-3	[]	[]
.53	F-3	F-3-Op:	[]
.54	F-3	[]	Unit with a paddy wagon, I need it at Everitt and Carver.
.59	F-3	F-3-Op:	10-4.
11:31.03	F-3	Ambulance Service:	Go ahead.
.04	F-3	F-3-Op:	Okay, we need, Everitt . . . (broken) . . . has he got there yet?
.07	F-3	Ambulance Service:	Yeah, I've got one.
.09	F-3	F-3-Op:	Okay, no further then.

.10 F-3 Ambulance Service: Okay.

11:31.12 F-3 [] [] advise all units, both
police and ambulance, to kill
their sirens before they come
into this area. They're just
making the situation worse.

.30 F-3 F-3-Op: 10-4. (Calls Ambulance Service.)

.32 F-3 F-3-S: What we got . . . What we got stuck?
(Supervisor)

.33 F-3 Ambulance Service: Yeah?

.35 F-3 F-3-S: Cancel your sirens.
(Supervisor)

.36 F-3 Ambulance Service: Okay.

.52 F-3 F-3-Op: []

.54 F-3 [] [] Everitt Street.

.56 F-3 F-3-Op: 10-4. F-1.

INJURED AND DECEASED.

The Following Individuals Died as a Result of Injuries
Received at Everitt Street and Carver Drive, November 3, 1979:

1. (W/M) James Michael Waller - 702 Cypress Street, Greensboro, N.C.
2. (W/M) Caesar Vinson Cauce - 106 Trinity Avenue, Durham, N.C.
3. (W/M) William E. Sampson - 2402 Apt. J Kersey Street, Greensboro, N.C.
4. (B/F) Sandy Smith - (possible) Kannapolis, N.C.
5. (W/M) Michael Ronald Nathan - 4428 Ryan Street, Durham, N.C.
(Deceased 11/5/79)

The Following Individuals were Treated at Greensboro Hospital:

1. (W/M) [redacted] - [redacted]
Shot in head; condition serious.
Current status: Remains in hospital.
2. (W/M) [redacted] - [redacted]
[redacted] N.C.
Shot in head; condition stable.
Current status: Released from hospital.

The Following Individuals were Treated at Cone Hospital:

3. (B/F) [redacted] - [redacted]
[redacted] N.C.
Head wound; treated and released.
4. (W/M) [redacted] - [redacted] N.C.
Shot in chest; condition stable.
Current status: Released from hospital.
5. (B/M) [redacted] - [redacted]
[redacted] N.C.
Cut on arm; treated and released.
Arrested, charged with inciting a riot.
Current status: Posted bond.
6. (W/M) [redacted] - [redacted]
Wounds to the legs; treated and released.
[redacted]
7. (W/M) [redacted] - [redacted]
[redacted] N.C.
Shotgun wounds to the legs; treated and released.
Arrested (believed to be part of the Klan).
8. (W/M) [redacted] - [redacted]
[redacted] N.C.
Shotgun wound to the legs; treated and released.
Arrested (believed to be part of the CWP).

The Following Individuals were Treated at Wesley Long Hospital:

9. (W/M)

[REDACTED]

-

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Shotgun wound to left cheek, left shoulders,
both hands, left buttocks, both legs. Condition
stable.

Current status: Released from hospital.

ARRESTED ON 11/3/79:

[REDACTED]

W.V.O.

Black Male

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] N.C.

Charged: Inciting to Riot
Resisting Arrest

[REDACTED]

W.V.O.

Black Female

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] N.C.

Charged: Interfere with L.E.O.

[REDACTED]

White Male

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] N.C.

Charged: Armed to the Terror
of the Public

[REDACTED]

Nazi

White Male

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] N.C.

Charged: Four (4) charges
of murder
One (1) charge of
conspiracy to commit
murder

[REDACTED]

KKK

White Male

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] N.C.

Charged: Four (4) charges
of murder
One (1) charge of
conspiracy to commit
murder

[REDACTED]

KKK

White Male

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] N.C.

Charged: Four (4) charges
of murder
One (1) charge of
conspiracy to commit
murder

[Redacted]

White Male

[Redacted]

[Redacted] N.C.

Charged: Four (4) charges of
murder
One (1) charge of
conspiracy to commit
murder

[Redacted]

White Male

[Redacted]

[Redacted] N.C.

Charged: Four (4) charges of
murder
One (1) charge of
conspiracy to commit
murder

[Redacted]

KKK

White Male

[Redacted]

[Redacted] N.C.

Charged: Four (4) charges of
murder
One (1) charge of
conspiracy to commit
murder

[Redacted]

KKK

White Male

[Redacted]

[Redacted] N.C.

Charged: Four (4) charges of
murder
One (1) charge of
conspiracy to commit
murder

[Redacted]

White Male

[Redacted]

[Redacted] N.C.

Charged: Four (4) charges of
murder
One (1) charge of
conspiracy to commit
murder

[Redacted]

White Male

[Redacted]

[Redacted] N.C.

Charged: Four (4) charges of
murder
One (1) charge of
conspiracy to commit
murder.

[REDACTED]

KKK

White Male

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] N.C.

Charged: Four (4) charges
of murder
One (1) charge of
conspiracy to commit
murder

[REDACTED]

KKK

White Male

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] N.C.

Charged: Four (4) charges
of murder
One (1) charge of
conspiracy to
commit murder

[REDACTED]

White Male

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] N.C.

Charged: Four (4) charges
of murder
One (1) charge of
conspiracy to commit
murder

ARRESTED ON 11/4/79:

[REDACTED]

Nazi

White Male

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] N.C.

Charged: Conspiracy to
commit murder

[REDACTED]

Nazi

White Male

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] N.C.

Charged: Conspiracy to
commit murder

ARRESTED ON 11/14/79:

[REDACTED]

KKK

White Male

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] N.C.

Charged: Four (4) charges
of murder
One (1) charge of
conspiracy to commit
murder

ALL CARS NOTIFIED SHOTS FIRED; 11:23.28 .

Number of Units	Call Number	Officer	Assignment	Location	Estimated		Number of Officers at Scene		
					Time Arrived	Response Time			
1			Tact.-B	Dudley High School	11:24	.35	1		
			Tact.-B	Dudley High School	11:24	.35	2		
2			Tact.-Lt.	Washington & Benbow	11:24	.40	3		
3			DII-202	Washington & Bennett	11:24	.40	4		
4			DII-203	Gorrell & DeWitt	11:24	.40	5		
5			DII-261	Gorrell & DeWitt	11:24	.40	6		
6			Tact.-B	Dudley High School	11:24	.45	7		
			Tact.-B	Dudley High School	11:24	.45	8		
7			DII-240	Washington & Law	11:24	.45	9		
8			DII-241	Florida & Willow	11:24	.45	10		
9			DII-220	Douglas & Asheboro	11:24	1:00	11		
10			DII-221	Asheboro & Broad	11:25	1:30	12		
11			Tact.-A	Asheboro & Benbow	11:25	2:00	13		
			Tact.-A	Asheboro & Benbow	11:25	2:00	14		
12			Tact.-A	Randolph & Florida	11:25	2:00	15		
			ID Spec.	Randolph & Florida	11:25	2:00	16		
13			DII-200	Lee & Law	11:25	2:00	17		
14			Tact.-B	220 & I-85	11:26	3:00	18		
			Tact.-B	220 & I-85	11:26	3:00	19		
15			Tact.-A	220 & Meadowview	11:26	3:00	20		
			Tact.-A	220 & Meadowview	11:26	3:00	21		

ALL CARS NOTIFIED SHOTS FIRED; 11:23.28

Number of Units	Call Number	Officer	Assignment	Location	Estimated Time Arrived	Response Time	Number of Officers at Scene
16			Tact.-A	29 & I-85	11:26	3:00	22
			Tact.-A	29 & I-85	11:26	3:00	23
17			Tact.-A	Gillespie School	11:27	4:00	24
			Tact.-A	Gillespie School	11:27	4:00	25
18			Tact.-B	220 & Meadowview	11:28	5:00	26
			Tact.-B	220 & Meadowview	11:28	5:00	27
19			DIII-302	Summit & Bessemer	11:28	5:00	28
20			DII-260	Police Department	11:28	5:00	29
21			DI-103	Summit & Bessemer	11:28	5:00	30

LOCATION OF POLICE VEHICLES AT 11:23.28 HRS, 3 November, 1979

NORTH



Anti-Klan leaders chummy to media, hostile to police

BY KATHERINE FULTON
Record Staff Writer

Despite charges that police failed to protect them adequately, organizers of last weekend's "Death to the Klan" march encouraged media coverage while actively discouraging close police protection.

Following a press conference Tuesday afternoon, Police Chief W.E. Swing said that his officers were greeted with hostility when they approached marchers at the Windsor Community Center Saturday morning and were not told the parade was actually forming at Everitt and Carver streets.

A reporter from a television station said a member of the Communist Workers Party had told her the site of the rally had been changed and that she should not tell the police about it.

Swing also indicated during the press conference that police were confused about the formation point, and that some officers responded first to Windsor Center when the shooting began about half a mile away at Everitt and Carver.

However, reporters and photographers who arrived at Windsor Center around 11 a.m. Saturday — the time and place the Communist Workers Party announced — were told the site of the march, as announced in flyers, had been changed, and in some cases were given explicit directions to Everitt and Carver streets. The site was never changed from the Everitt and Carver position on the parade permit.

Four television reporter/photographer teams and one newspaper reporter and photographer witnessed the shootings which resulted in five deaths, but police did not arrive until the firing had ceased.

It has become clear that confusion

about the formation point of the march may have contributed to the results of the confrontation.

The teams from WFMY (Channel 2) of Greensboro and WTVD (Channel 11) of Durham were the first news people to arrive at about 10:30 a.m. at Windsor Center. According to Matt Sinclair, reporter for WTVD, and Jim Waters, photographer for WFMY, both teams were told the site of the march beginning was Everitt and Carver and were given explicit directions how to get there. The only parade flyer distributed announced 11 a.m. at Windsor Center for the start.

Sinclair said a woman claimed the change had been widely advertised in Greensboro the week before the march.

Apparently, the team from WXII (Channel 12) of Winston-Salem arrived at the center next, a few minutes before 11. Reporter Laura Blumenthal said a woman she recognized as a member of the Communist Workers Party told her, "The location of the rally had been changed to Everitt Street and not to tell the police."

The photographer assigned by WGHP (Channel 13) of High Point refused to discuss the matter because he said station personnel have been subpoenaed.

But the WGHP team apparently arrived next at the center, and were quickly followed by Greensboro Daily News reporter Winston Cavin and photographer Don Davis.

Cavin said he arrived shortly after 11 a.m. and the WGHP team was interviewing Nelson Johnson, leader of the leftist group sponsoring the march. Johnson told the reporters a bigger crowd was gathering at Morningside Home at Everitt and Carver streets.

(Continued on Page B3, Col. 1)

Greensboro Record
November 7, 1979
Wednesday

APPENDIX M

Communists shunned police

From Page B1

Johnson then got into a car and drove off, Cavin said, and the remaining reporters and photographers followed.

Davis said two police cars drove into the Windsor Center parking lot shortly before 11 while he was waiting for Cavin to arrive. The police got out, Davis said, and "the crowd started jeering, 'Pigs go home, we don't need you.'"

Nelson Johnson, contacted Tuesday night, said he did tell Channel 8 the march was moving to Everitt Street, and explained that he had announced the march for 11 a.m. Saturday to create "a certain amount of diversion from people who would want to ride by and attack our leadership."

Johnson again charged that police protection was inadequate and pointed out that only his group and the police knew the parade was always scheduled to start at noon at Everitt and Carver streets. Johnson had obtained the required parade permit on Oct. 19 listing that site as the origination of the march.

"It's a fact they (the police) knew the Klan was coming and that they allowed them to penetrate our ranks and that they were not there when the Klan arrived. Their justification is that we asked them not to be there. That's ridiculous because they don't take instructions from us . . . The police knew where we were going to start," Johnson said.

Johnson further charged that the state, probably in the form of the FBI, had penetrated the Klan to conduct a well-planned assassination of his group. The motivation, he said, was to reduce workers' capacity to resist in times of economic difficulty by pitting one group against another.

Johnson had made a similar charge last Thursday when he announced the "Death to the Klan" march by accusing city officials and police of backing the Ku Klux Klan and warned that the police and Mayor Melvin should, "Stay out of our way."

Police Chief Swing has said that he kept his men at a distance to avoid a confrontation with protest marchers.

Police also have revealed that a man who may have been a Klansman or a Nazi obtained a copy of the parade permit on Nov. 3. Police officials said that they do not know if the man, who said his last name was Dawson, is linked to the shootings, but they are exploring possible connections.

Since the police have said the carloads of armed men headed for the rally went directly to the Everitt Street site without first stopping at Windsor Center, the question of how they made that decision has remained unresolved.

Swing presented detailed excerpts from police radio transmissions at Tuesday's press conference in an effort to explain how police prepared for and responded to the incident.

Swing said the Greensboro police had prior knowledge that the Klan would be at the rally and had assigned a surveillance car at Highway 220 and I-85 to watch for suspicious vehicles. The excerpted transcript records the conversation between the surveillance car and officers assigned to the march.

The surveillance car was the first on the scene at Everitt and Carver streets. After the shooting was reported over the police radio, four police cars arrived at the scene in a sequence of 35, 35, 40 and 45 seconds, Swing said. Five cars were on the scene within one minute and 15 cars within four minutes, he said.

The transcript covering 21 minutes Saturday morning contains:

● 11:06.39 — Surveillance car reports, "Okay, you got eight vehicles parked and loaded on the ramp from down where we went this morning. They're on the ramp of 85 and 220. It looks like about 30 or 35 people, maybe not that many in the vehicles. So, we're gonna stand by here and kinda monitor them, see what they do."

● 11:11.06 — Surveillance car reports, "...we got about eight vehicles the opposite side parked on the ramp at 85 and 220, headed your direction. However, they're stationary at this time. We'll have further if they move in."

● 11:13.51 — Surveillance car reports, "We're rolling now, headed that direction from this location. There's a total now of nine vehicles."

● 11:16.20 — Surveillance car reports, "...on 29 now, approaching Florida Street."

● 11:16.35 — Supervisor's car (at parade site) reports, "They got 14 more minutes according to my watch, rush 'em up." (The four police cars assigned to sites along the parade route were to be at their positions at 11:30 a.m., the same time police were to meet with Nelson Johnson, Communist Workers Party leader, at Everitt and Carver to go over final parade plans.)

● 11:18.57 — Surveillance car reports, "Turning on Willow Road now."

● 11:19.22 — Supervisor's car, "Let's hustle on into those positions." (The four police cars involved in the parade are encouraged to get to their assigned positions. Two of the cars are assigned to Everitt and Carver. One car will lead the parade, the other will follow.)

● 11:19.28 — Supervisor's car, "Let's hustle on in and get in those positions because they're moving before we anticipated." (Marchers were assembling at Everitt and Carver streets earlier than anticipated.)

● 11:20.52 — Surveillance car reports, "They're parking up on Everitt Street at Willow Road." (The convoy had turned on Everitt Street.)

● 11:22.02 — Surveillance car reports, "They're now at the formation point." (The convoy is at Everitt and Carver.)

● 11:22.25 — Surveillance car reports, "OK, we got about nine or 10 cars on the opposite side has now arrived at the formation point for the parade and it appears as though they're heckling at this time; driving on by, uh, they're definitely creating attention and some of the parade members are, uh, (break in transmission)...10-4, they're scattering, stand by one."

● 11:23.13 — Surveillance car reports, "We've got a 10-10 down here, you better get some units in here." (A 10-10 is a fight in progress.)

● 11:23.28 — Surveillance car reports, "Shots fired, (it) sounds like..."

● 11:23.47 — Surveillance car reports, "Heavy gunfire."

● 11:25.53 — Squad car at the scene reports, "Get me an ambulance down here...several ambulances."

● 11:26.35 — Squad car reports, "They're Signal 50." (Signal 50 means everything is under control, no help needed.)

● 11:27.19 — Squad car reports, "Have all units on F-1 switch to F-3 and seal off Carver and Everitt Street area, wide perimeter." (F-1 and F-3 are radio channels.)

PERSONNEL LIST

The following is a listing of police personnel assigned to the Anti-Klan march and rally:

Captain [REDACTED]	Commanding Officer, Division II
Lieutenant [REDACTED]	Executive Officer, Division II
Sergeant [REDACTED]	Supervisor, Division II, Squad A
Police Squad Leader [REDACTED]	Division II, Squad A
Police Officer II [REDACTED]	Division II, Squad A
Lieutenant [REDACTED]	Field Commander, Tactical Section
Sergeant [REDACTED]	Supervisor, Tactical Section, Squad A
Police Squad Leader [REDACTED]	Tactical Section, Squad A
Police Officer II [REDACTED]	Tactical Section, Squad A
Police Officer II [REDACTED]	Tactical Section, Squad A
Police Officer II [REDACTED]	Tactical Section, Squad A
Police Officer II [REDACTED]	Tactical Section, Squad A
Police Officer II [REDACTED]	Tactical Section, Squad A
Police Officer II [REDACTED]	Tactical Section, Squad A
Police Officer II [REDACTED]	Tactical Section, Squad A
Sergeant [REDACTED]	Supervisor, Tactical Section, Squad B
Police Squad Leader [REDACTED]	Tactical Section, Squad B
Police Officer II [REDACTED]	Tactical Section, Squad B
Police Officer II [REDACTED]	Tactical Section, Squad B
Police Officer II [REDACTED]	Tactical Section, Squad B
Police Officer II [REDACTED]	Tactical Section, Squad B
Police Officer II [REDACTED]	Tactical Section, Squad B
Police Officer II [REDACTED]	Tactical Section, Squad B
Detective [REDACTED]	Criminal Investigation Division
Identification Specialist [REDACTED]	Police Crime Lab
Identification Specialist [REDACTED]	Police Crime Lab
[REDACTED]	Police Attorney